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THE DEVIL WE KNOW: RACIAL SUBORDINATION AND
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
GIL GoT*
S INCE September 11, Muslims, Arabs and South Asians in the United
States have had to contend with disparate and abusive treatment, both
within civil society and at the hands of state actors including security, law
enforcement and prison officials.' It would seem a horrible exaggeration
to say that post-September 11 has been a period of "open season" on these
groups. To be sure, high-ranking officials have denounced hate crimes
and hate speech, and law enforcement has arrested and tried perpetrators
of these crimes. Private individuals and groups have shown solidarity with
these communities. But, the countless reported incidents of abuse suf-
fered by Muslims, Arabs and South Asians at the hands of state and private
actors imbue such other tokens of executive and societal "tolerance" and
concern with an air of hypocrisy. In such an environment it behooves us
to consider how liberal democratic systems might evolve legal and other
forms of group-based remedies and safeguards to counter the socially and
politically pernicious effects of what may well be a new and enduring form
of religiously-inflected, unbounded, all-or-nothing warfare.
This article asks the "subordination question" with regard to contem-
porary national security law and policy.2 It will consider how our scholar-
ship and institutions construct national security law and policy in ways that
afford either greater or lesser degrees of analytical and normative primacy
to the problems of racialized group-based social harms that commonly sur-
round exercises of national security-related powers. The anti-subordina-
tionist methodology deployed here foregrounds such problems and allows
us more accurately to assess the real costs of "states of emergency" by mov-
ing beyond standard law-versus-security framings. By focusing on "enemy
group" demonization we are also better able to grasp the identity-inflected
basis of the constructed security horizon itself, in effect analytically open-
ing up to contestation the statist "black box" of emergency construction.
Finally, the normative pre-commitments of an anti-subordinationist per-
spective allow us to judge the merits and the desirability of national secur-
* Assistant Professor, DePaul University, International Studies.
1. For a discussion on the abuse of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians in the
United States, see infra Part III.
2. I borrow the formulation from feminist methodology that posited "the wo-
man question." For discussion of the woman question in the legal context, see
Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV L. REv. 829, 837 (1990)
(explaining "'woman question,' which is designed to identify the gender implica-
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ity law and policy from a perspective that resists resolving the law-security
binarism into unrestrained political decisionism.3
Given an abundance of historical and contemporary evidence that na-
tional security rationales and measures are socially contingent in both con-
ception and effect (reflecting at the bottom, societal pathologies such as
racial and ethnic animus), it would seem likely that mainstream legal
scholars would treat the resulting group-based harms as central to the
post-September 11 national security law and policy debates. Indeed, the
research I present in this article shows that it is not the case that liberal
legal sensibilities wholly fail to apprehend the problems of group demon-
ization in security crises. Legal liberalism, in fact, evinces due concern for
state abuse of emergency powers and acknowledges the "distributional"
inequalities inherent in such abusive practices, that is, the disproportion-
ate burdening of "out-groups" in state security crises. The legal literature,
however, typically orients itself around the narrow problem of how best to
balance the conflicting demands of law-usually conceived of as minimal-
ized individual civil liberties protections and/or institutional balancing-
and state security. I will show that legal liberalism has not effectively con-
fronted the devil we know all too well-the subordination of racialized
enemy groups, in this case, Arabs, Muslims or South Asians.
I look at two categories of post-September 11 liberal and progressive
legal responses, accommodationist approaches 4 and more oppositional,
albeit formalistic, civil liberties-based critiques. The first group of ap-
proaches seeks generally to accommodate law and justice to national se-
curity-related "necessity" and is animated in part by valorization and even
identification with the state and its putative security needs. Alternatively,
the formalistic civil liberties approaches would generally apply the Consti-
tution in more or less the same way regardless of the state's perceived
security dilemma. This "business as usual" approach distrusts hypertro-
phied governmental powers and uses civil liberties framings to critique
3. Decisionism here connotes the exercise of raw political and state power,
relatively unconstrained by law or ethics.
4. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1058 (2003) (defining models of accommoda-
tion that "countenance a certain degree of accommodation for the pressures ex-
erted on the state in times of emergency, while, at the same time, maintaining
normal legal principles and rules as much as possible"); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REv. 605, 606 (2003) (defining
accommodation view as view that "the Constitution should be relaxed or sus-
pended during an emergency"). Accommodation also describes a political dy-
namic. For example, in the aftermath of September 11, academics were faced with
the hard choice of either "accommodating" the more aggressive national security
policies of the Bush administration or being dismissed as irrelevant to the serious
business of defending the nation. Observers of the Washington scene have identi-
fied such a dynamic. See, e.g., Georgie Anne Geyer, Trading with a Currency of Fear,
(Oct. 22, 2004), at http://opednews.orb6.com/stories/ucgg/20041022/trad-
ingwithacurrencyoffear.php (discussing fear tactics used by Bush and Kerry in
2004 presidential campaigns).
[Vol. 50: p. 10731074
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security regimes, such as the one arising from the war on terrorism. 5
While I consider the work of civil liberties advocates to be courageous and
crucial for the broader project of creating a more just national security
culture, I will consider how both accommodationist and formalistic civil
liberties approaches similarly may occlude key subordinationist dimen-
sions of the war on terrorism.
Anti-subordinationist principles require taking more complete ac-
count of how enemy groups are racialized, and how they come to be con-
structed as outsiders and the kinds of harms that may befall them as such.
Group-based status harms include those that have been inscribed in law
and effectuated through state action, and those that arise within civil soci-
ety, through social structures, institutions, culture and habitus. Familiarity
with the processes of racialization is a necessary precondition for appreci-
ating and remedying such injuries. Applying anti-subordinationist think-
ing to national security law and policy does not require arguing that only
race-based effects matter, but does require affording significant analytical
and normative weight to the problems of such status harms. Racial inju-
ries require racial remedies.
Foregrounding anti-subordinationist principles in national security
law and policy analysis departs significantly from traditional approaches in
the field. Nonetheless, arguments based in history, political theory and
pragmatism suggest that such a fundamental departure is warranted. His-
torically, emergency-induced "states of exception" 6 that have suspended
legal protections against governmental abuses have tended to be identity-
based in conception and implementation. 7 Viewed from the perspective
of critical political theory, the constellation of current "security threats"
rests on the epochal co-production of identity-based and market-driven
5. See Gross, supra note 4, at 1044-45 (referring to these as "business as usual"
approaches).
6. "The exception" refers throughout this paper to the problem liberal legal
systems face when state actors declare emergencies that require suspension of the
normal rules of law. Weimar legal theorist Carl Schmitt famously used the prob-
lem of the exception to critique liberal legal systems. See generally Oren Gross, The
Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Powers and The
"Norm-Exception"Dichotomy, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 1825 (2000) (discussing Schmitt's
theory of emergency powers). More recently, postmodern legal and political theo-
rists have come to understand the exception as symbolic of the state's permanent
and absolute dominion over "bare life," an aspect of law's basic structure that
places in doubt the possibility of liberal and democratic impulses operating
through "the rule of law." See Gil Gott, Identity and Crisis: The Critical Race Project
and Postmodern Political Theory, 78 DENV. U. L. REv. 817, 834-45 (2001) (discussing
postmodern political theory and exception).
7. The Japanese internment is the obvious example. For a discussion analyz-
ing accomodationist approaches that incorporate security-inflected logic in trun-
cating the regulative role law plays in national security, see infra Part I; see alsoJohn
Hayakawa T6r6k, Ideological Deportation: The Case of Kwong Hai Chew (2004)
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global political antagonisms, referred to somewhat obliquely as civilization
clashes or perhaps more forthrightly as American imperialism.
Pragmatically, it makes no sense to fight terrorism by alienating mil-
lions of Muslim, Arab and South Asian residents in the United States and
hundreds of millions more abroad through abusive treatment and double
standards operative in identity-based repression at home and in selective,
preemptive U.S. militarism abroad. Such double standards undermine
the democratic legitimacy of the United States both in its internal affairs
and in its assertions of global leadership. Indeed, there seems to be no
shortage of perspectives from which liberal legal institutions would be en-
joined from embracing a philosophy of political decisionism precisely at the
interface of law and security, an anomic frontier along which are likely to
arise identity-based regimes of exception and evolving race-based forms of
subordination.
Part I analyzes accommodationist approaches that variously incorpo-
rate security-inflected logic in truncating the regulative role law plays in
national security contexts. I will seek to understand the accommodationist
thrust of these interventions in light of the authors' operative assumptions
regarding the proper array of interests and exigencies to be balanced. I
will argue that the interests of demonized "enemy groups" facing race-
based status harm-Muslims, Arabs and South Asians in the United
States-are ineffectively engaged through accommodationist frameworks.
The decisionist impulse of these analyses, that is, the tendency to acqui-
esce in the outcomes of non-substantively constrained statist and/or
majoritarian political process, results from an incomplete grasp of the
racialization processes. In short, more race consciousness is needed in
national security law and policy in order to cement substantive commit-
ments and procedural safeguards against historical and ongoing race-
based subordination through the racialization of "security threats."
Part II examines approaches that rely on formalistic understandings
of civil liberties in critiquing the government's post-September 11 policies.
These approaches also inadequately center subordinationist effects in
their criticisms of the war on terrorism. In lieu of anti-subordinationist
commitments, these approaches complicate the formal distinction be-
tween aliens or immigrants and citizens. While such critiques of alienage-
based distinctions and other de jure nativisms increasingly define the pa-
rameters of civil liberties and social justice advocacy in immigration law,
much of the critical force of such approaches remains cabined. First, they
remain cabined within a particular argumentative frame determined by
the limits of the "national imaginary" and, second, within an aspect of
white normativity that analogizes between the experiences of European
immigrants and immigrants of color.
Part III argues that September 11 represents a watershed in the racial-
ization of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians as people of color in the
United States. I brief the nature and magnitude of harms accruing to
1076 [Vol. 50: p. 1073
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Muslims, Arabs and South Asians both through the government's policies
in the war on terrorism and through societal dynamics. The evidence in-
dicates that we are seeing not only legal but also social and political clo-
sures (and resistances) that typify racial formation processes in the United
States. Those processes have both constructed and subordinated racial-
ized minorities over many generations. Moreover, the current dynamic
reflects an extension and acceleration of trends negatively impacting Mus-
lims, Arabs and South Asians that were already in train well before Septem-
ber 11, 2001.
Parts I through III make the case that legal liberalism has responded
ineffectively to the demonization and racialized subordination of Arabs,
Muslims and South Asians in the United States. In Part IV, I will contextu-
alize this failing by examining the international political system and the
ways it structures current conceptualizations of state violence and state de-
cisions on the exception in the war on terrorism. Status harms to Muslims,
Arabs and South Asians are cases of a racialization of security that contin-
ues apace, made even more likely under post-modern international struc-
tures that operate at ever greater removes from the rationalist assumptions
of the modern international system. Part V concludes by placing the cur-
rent securitization of race in a historical and normative context that com-
pels prioritization of the subordinationist devil we know in the war on
terrorism, quite apart from the devils the state and state actors claim to
know.
I. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION: LEGAL LIBERALISM AND THE
WAR ON TERRORISM
September 11 has led to the most significant scholarly and public
scrutiny of U.S. national security law and policy since the Vietnam era.
The specter of large-scale violent attacks by so-called Islamist terrorists has
prompted renewed debate about whether and how constitutional protec-
tions should apply in times of national emergencies, and what role the
judiciary should play in overseeing the government's exercise of security
powers. 8 Some view September 11 as having ended what we might call the
Cold War national security law equilibrium, that is, executive-legislative
power sharing, tempered by the real possibility of judicial intervention ei-
ther in the service of substantive protections of individual liberties or as
referee and interpreter of power-sharing arrangements between the politi-
cal branches. The model of a unilateralist "emergency executive," empow-
8. Various legal memoranda generated from within the Bush administration
apparently viewed the "changed world" after September 11 as legitimating a new
more unilateralist and "extra-legal" view of international and domestic security law
questions. By contrast, the Oklahoma City bombing by white supremacists, for
example, though catastrophic in its own ight did not lead to an outpouring of
scholarship in the field. The threat from specifically Muslim-identified terrorists
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ered to take swift and decisive action without having to be concerned with
winning ex ante congressional authorization or ex postjudicial approval, has
returned as the symbolic counterpoise to the terrorist threat. The discipli-
nary center of gravity, however, is found in what I refer to as accommoda-
tionist approaches that seek, short of creating an "imperial presidency," to
adjust liberal democratic norms and practices to fit the reconfigured na-
tional security environment.
Generally, accommodationist approaches provide important and so-
phisticated elaborations of positions that were staked out by Justice Jack-
son in his opinions in the Japanese internment cases and later in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (the "Steel Seizure Case"). 9 The politi-
cal and jurisprudential impulses retrieved from these now canonical twen-
tieth century national security law opinions range from a posture of
judicial deference or quietism, reliance on an institutional process-based
balancing calculus, and a concern with the longer-term health and legiti-
macy of liberal rule of law systems and their judiciaries. In addition, to-
day's accommodationists often followJustice Jackson's dissent in Korematsu
v. United States,10 recognizing the potential for, if not the inevitability of,
racialized group subordination occurring under the guise of national se-
curity necessity.
In this section, I assess two types of accommodationist approaches,
asking whether and how effectively these approaches intervene to remedy
race-based injuries accruing to "discrete and insular" minorities in the
wake of the state's and society's reaction to the perceived threat from Is-
lamist terrorists. The first approach I examine is premised on a model of
social learning that generally cuts against concerns of civil libertarians re-
garding the repressive effects of the war on terrorism. The social learning
model assures us that contemporary America's current state of social
learning regarding the importance of civil liberties militates against the
types of power abuses that occurred in the past in the name of national
security. The social learning model generally counsels deference on the
part of advocates, lawyers and judges toward the members of the political
branch responsible for exercising the state's security function. Moreover,
despite the social learning model's recognition that group demonization
is a likely consequence of such exercises of the security function, the ap-
proach provides no remedy for the resulting racialized subordination. For
demonized "enemy" groups the question arises: exactly what have "we"
learned from the past and how does that social learning protect "us" from
racialized harms in the future?
Second, I examine process-based approaches that see bilateral (exec-
utive and congressional) political review as the democratic floor below
9. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson,J., concurring) (discussing three cat-
egories for executive actions).
10. 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that decision
will lead to subordination of racial groups under guise of national security).
[Vol. 50: p. 10731078
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which exercises of national security power should not be allowed to slide.
That floor is, at a minimum, quite "sticky," given the aversion such ap-
proaches have toward substantive commitments that could ameliorate the
subordinationist effects of institutional politics and majoritarian democ-
racy that such models rely upon. While certain of these approaches seem
generally more open to contemplating race-based justice concerns and
even incorporate some basic substantive protections, their narrower focus
on problems of judicial legitimation prevents them from dealing effec-
tively with the problems of racial subordination. Even if the courts avoid
endorsing government abuses, thus preserving judicial legitimacy, subordi-
nated groups may rightfully ask: through what means and to what end will
that legitimacy have been retained?
A. Social Learning
In order to gain a sense at the outset of how subordinationist con-
cerns remain peripheral to the mainstream of accommodationist thinking,
it is instructive to consider briefly the work of scholars whose seeming em-
brace of the unilateralist executive places them somewhat outside legal
liberalism's disciplinary mainstream. In their response to critics of the
government's post-September 11 exercises of emergency powers, Univer-
sity of Chicago Professors Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule identify
what they see as civil libertarian critics' two main forms of argument-one
based on the idea of a ratchet mechanism whereby civil liberties lose out
to national security interests over time, and one based on the problem of
fear-induced panic that causes government actors to overreact to per-
ceived threats. Posner and Vermeule counter the latter "panic thesis" in a
way that is striking for both its honesty and indifference regarding the
destructive and distorting role racial animus can play in emergency-based
exercise of state power. They write:
Fear generated by immediate threats, then, causes instinctive re-
sponses that are not rational in the cognitive sense, not always
desirable, and not a good basis for public policy, but it is not this
kind of fear that leads to restrictions of civil liberties during war-
time. The internment ofJapanese Americans during World War II may
have been due to racial animus or to a mistaken assessment of the risks; it
was not the direct result of panic; indeed, there was a delay of
weeks before the policy was seriously considered.11
What is more remarkable to me than the authors' ostensible point regard-
ing the relative insignificance of panic in policy formation during emer-
gencies is their rather matter-of-fact attribution of problematic civil
11. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 633 (emphasis added).
10792005]
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liberties restrictions to racial animus. 12 Posner and Vermeule do not ex-
plore further the impact of their observation concerning the determina-
tive role played by racial animus and, thus, do not assess their own
thinking on judicial deference in light of what they concede may be gov-
ernment actors' irrational decision-basis. This move, in effect if not in
intent, normalizes by not assessing as "irrational" white fears of racialized
Others in policy makers' decision-bases. Nevertheless, the authors' deci-
sion to not focus their analysis on racial animus as an irrational decision-
basis, though such animus would seem pertinent to the panic-thesis that
their article works at length to refute, can be explained by the fact that
Posner and Vermeule obviously intended their article as a response to the
types of arguments contemporary critics have mounted against enhanced
state power in emergency contexts. Posner and Vermeule would have had
to look beyond the "usual suspects" for critics who methodologically cen-
tered racial or ethnic animus in assessing the legal and social conse-
quences of the government's war on terrorism.
This is not to say that the disciplinary mainstream is unaware that
demonized and racialized Others suffer the brunt of power abuses in state
security crises. Even those models that acknowledge the problem of
group-based subordination fail to provide commensurate racial remedies.
For example, progressive constitutional scholar Mark Tushnet's social
learning thesis affords significant rhetorical weight to the problem that
state security measures typically target constructed enemy "Others."13
Tushnet offers a qualification of what he calls the Whig narrative regard-
ing social learning, which posits that social learning over time has led to
greater respect for civil liberties in emergencies, along lines that will
sound familiar to anti-subordinationists:
The social learning process couples learning about exaggerated
reactions to perceived threats with a persistent creation of an
Other-today, the non-citizen-who is outside the scope of our
concern.... The Whig version of social learning does identify a
12. Presumably, based on what they wrote in the above quote, the authors
would also agree that the existence of racial animus could be a significant factor in
mistaken risk assessment.
13. See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in War-
time, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 273 (2003) (discussing idea that every security crisis results
in destruction of civil liberties, but United States has been unable to prevent itself
from repeating their mistakes). Another article appearing around the time of
Tushnet's, co-authored by Jack Goldsmith and Cass Sunstein, applies a similar
analysis. SeeJack Goldsmith & Cass Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture:
What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261 (2002) (discussing
reasons why President Bush was criticized for enabling military commissions to try
terrorists, but President Roosevelt was praised for creating a military commission
to try Nazi saboteurs). While a similar thesis animates Goldsmith's and Sunstein's
analysis, they do not necessarily advocate the same extra-constitutional validity
model as Tushnet. Posner and Vermeule focus much of their critique on the
ratchet thesis which they find at the base of both Tushnet's and Goldsmith's and
Sunstein's arguments, a point I do not analyze in this article.
1080 [Vol. 50: p. 1073
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real process in which government policy in response to emergen-
cies has a decreasingly small range, but a more pessimistic view
would direct our attention to the fact that the policy continues to
focus on the Other.
14
Tushnet identifies this distorting effect of "focus on the Other" as "the
central issue in thinking about civil liberties in wartime." 15 Moreover,
Tushnet understands that abuses of security powers, as a matter of histori-
cal fact, are often based on clear knowledge either that the threat was
exaggerated or nonexistent, or that the chosen (abusive) policy response
would be ineffective at curbing any real threat. He reminds us in this con-
text of General John L. DeWitt, whose evidentiary basis for imprisoning
some 120,000 innocent civilians was nothing more than a racist worldview
regarding Japanese Americans.
In this light, Tushnet's "defense" of Korematsu is intentionally ironic
and nuanced: "Korematsu was part of a process of social learning that both
diminishes contemporary threats to civil liberties in our present situation
and reproduces a framework of constitutionalism that ensures that such
threats will be a permanent part of the constitutional landscape." 16
Tushnet's intervention seeks to combine the Whig narrative regarding so-
cial learning with a concern that courts might in fact unwittingly normal-
ize executive assertions of unchecked emergency powers by, as the
Korematsu Court did, subjecting abusive policies to pseudo-constitutional
review. Because judges are likely, in Tushnet's view, to succumb to the
security hysterias of the day, any constitutional review to which they sub-
ject the government's wartime policies will most likely amount to a mere
rubber-stamping of those policies, creating bad precedent, if not encour-
agement, for future exercises of such executive power.17
Tushnet identifies three arrangements for negotiating the resulting
tensions between state emergency powers and constitutional protections.
In his final analysis, Tushnet declares his support for a form of judicial
deference that places most exercises of emergency powers beyond real ju-
dicial review. Tushnet's preference reflects an assessment that the most
pressing constitutional issue in emergency contexts is the problem ofjudi-
cial legitimation of governmental overreach.' 8 For Tushnet, the possibil-
14. Tushnet, supra note 13, at 298.
15. Id. at 298.
16. Id. at 274; see also, Gil Gott, A Tale of New Precedents: Japanese American In-
ternment as Foreign Affairs Law, 40 B.C. L. REv. 179, 193 (1998) (proposing using
internment cases as part of critical genealogy of foreign affairs law).
17. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 282-83 (discussing author's belief that any
wartime policy will be approved by courts). This recalls Justice Jackson's famous
reference to the Korematsu decision as a "loaded weapon." See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The principle [endorsed by the
majority] then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.").
18. Tushnet's options include: (1) using the original constitution as the "sole
guide"; (2) add to the constitution a process for declaring and administering an
10812005]
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ity of extra-constitutional validity for problematic governmental policies is
"consistent with the persistence of the constitutional regime."1 9 However
one may feel about creating a new category of extra-constitutional validity,
an idea that other writers endorse as a way of insuring against the constitu-
tionalization of anti-democratic (Schmittean) states of exception, Tushnet
does not extend his insight regarding the problem of the security state's
focus on the other into his assessment of the approaches he contemplates
for squaring state emergency powers with the values of constitutional
democracy. 2
0
Indeed, Tushnet fails to characterize as categorical civil liberties viola-
tions some of the most salient abuses of the war on terror. He mentions
those policies that have targeted thousands and tens of thousands of Mus-
lims and Arabs in the United States-Kafkaesque indefinite detentions,
selective deportation for minor immigration infractions and intimidating
interrogation by law enforcement officials-and grants that "in some in-
stances, the actions taken might be true violations of civil liberties."
2 1
Tushhet concludes, nonetheless, that a meaningful distinction must be
maintained between harm to citizens and harm to non-citizens. Because
he does not elaborate, it is unclear exactly why or how those lines are or
should be drawn, or when the distinction between citizens and non-citi-
zens might become constitutionally problematic. But, one senses the fa-
miliar deployment of civil liberties formalism, rendering the status harms
that accrue to racialized groups across the citizen/non-citizen divide
irrelevant.
Tushnet's social learning hypothesis posits a public awareness that the
government has exaggerated the existence of threats in the past and has
dealt ineffectively with real threats that existed. The public is thus less
inclined to trust governmental claims regarding threats, and governmen-
tal actors who know of this social learning will limit the scope of their
responses to such perceived threats. 22 Tushnet, however, also asserts a
qualified defense of policymakers who he sees as facing ex ante decision
contexts wherein exaggerations and overreactions are "entirely rational
emergency regime, i.e., "constraining emergency powers by constitutionalizing
them"; and (3) treating emergency powers as extra-constitutional but somehow
valid, that is, having courts not endorse such exercises so that the exceptional nature
of emergency-based policies is clear. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 299-300 (dis-
cussing three options).
19. Id. at 306.
20. See Gross, supra note 5, at 1826-27. The Schmittean exception refers to
Carl Schmitt's famous aphorism that he is sovereign who decides the exception,
meaning to suspend the normal operation of the rule of law. See id.
21. Tushnet, supra note 13, at 297.
22. See id. at 283-84. Tushnet is also aware, however, that repressive policies
evolve over time. See id. So, new policies might appear consistent with the social
learning thesis, but the more things seem to change, the more repression may in
fact stay the same. Thus, critics of governmental policies face the prospect of con-
stantly fighting the last war, whereas the present war should be seen as involving
new forms of overreach and repression.
[Vol. 50: p. 10731082
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and ought not be criticized in retrospect."2 3 He admonishes those who
would constrain policy-makers in such contexts, warning that "we should
be careful not to constrain them because of our hindsight wisdom-unless
we are confident that the constraints we put in place really do respond
only to tendencies to exaggerate uncertain threats or to develop ineffective
policy responses to real ones."24 Tushnet, however, fails to consider how
racism informs the "rational" exaggerations and overreactions of policy
makers that he views as beyond critique.
In the end, Tushnet's social learning-based model promises little, if
any, protection or remedy for demonized Others. Tushnet counsels too
much caution for civil society actors who would otherwise presumably em-
body and operationalize social learning in their deployment of "hindsight
wisdom" to challenge repressive security policies. Absent the use of such
wisdom, however, it is hard to imagine how civil rights can be championed
in the face of ex ante state monopoly over relevant information. 25 Moreo-
ver, Tushnet's reliance on the Whig version of social learning allows him
to remove the judiciary from an active, let alone robust, role in overseeing
security state actors. What we are left with is a historically unsupported
faith that state actors will themselves have sufficiently internalized social
learning to prevent abuses of the Other. In other words, Tushnet's offer
to demonized groups amounts to little more than a form of political deci-
sionism cloaked in the hope that social learning (among state actors) can
stanch the negative synergy of hysteria and racism.
Deploying the notion of social learning from a critical race perspec-
tive, we might be able to take a more complete account of the subordina-
tionist problem in state security power exercises and provide effective
racial remedies. As opposed to a white-normative deployment of social
learning, a critical race perspective would reject a Whig narrative that
presents the internment as something that has been transcended, as a sym-
bol of a redeemed/enlightened national identity. The concept of social
learning, in this sense, would have to be refined substantially to focus on
the more critical problem of "racial learning." What exactly has white
America learned from the internment? To what extent have the state's
culturally and demographically white security institutions and policy-mak-
ers actually internalized critical race perspectives on group subordination,
racial injury and racial remedy? Indeed, to what extent has the legal acad-
emy and the judiciary internalized these perspectives?
23. Id. at 287.
24. Id. at 287-88.
25. The most egregious abuses of legal process in the internment cases re-
volved precisely around attempts to shield policymakers from judicial scrutiny of
their decision-bases. See Gott, supra note 16, at 22545 (discussing government law-
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B. Process-Based Approaches
In their article, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes present the
case from "positive law" for a version of the political-process-based ap-
proach to the courts' role in wartime. 26 The authors argue that U.S.
courts have tended to reject the two extremes that characterize public dis-
course on civil liberties and national security during crises-neither sub-
jecting national security policies to substantive review as would be
consistent with the individual rights-based thinking of civil libertarians,
nor having simply deferred to the President as executive unilateralists
would desire. "Instead," Issacharoff and Pildes argue, "the courts have de-
veloped a process-based, institutionally-oriented (as opposed to rights-ori-
ented) framework for examining the legality of governmental action in
extreme security contexts."27
Outside national security law contexts there is, of course, a long his-
tory of pitting process-based approaches against the demands of substan-
tive racial justice.28 Process-based approaches respond to the so-called
counter-majoritarian dilemma that valorizes decisions of the political
branches as more democratically legitimate than decisions of courts. 29
Barbara Flagg, however, shows that faith in process-based principles of ju-
dicial review, which putatively avoid application of "non-neutral" substan-
tive norms, is a "transparently white" proposition.3 0 The last half-century's
"enduring principle" of neutral process-based approaches to constitu-
tional review for racial minorities has benefitted whites and disadvantaged
26. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1, 5 (2004) (discussing move to process-based, institutionally-
oriented framework). Though I focus on Issacharoff and Pildes here, Oren Gross
also offers a more fully articulated process-based approach, premised on a popu-
list-democratic conception of political process. Gross's "extra-legal measures"
model provides for governmental actors in emergencies going "outside the consti-
tutional order," but being subjected, ex post, to a political process in which "the
people decide" whether the extra-legal actions are acceptable. See Gross, supra
note 4, at 1023. Gross's approach, like other process-based approaches, offers little
by way of substantive or results-oriented protections for subordinated "enemy
groups." Id. at 1134.
27. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 5.
28. See generally Barbara Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitu-
tional Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 935 (1994) (surveying history of process-based ap-
proaches from critical race perspective).
29. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
I-HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959) (providing one of most well known versions of argument
for "neutral" process-based constitutional review in order to counter the counter-
majoritarian difficulty).
30. See Flagg, supra note 28, at 975 (explaining that "transparently white" the-
ory effects judicial review because "it has contributed to a climate of discourse in
which processual analyses displace substantive constitutional interpretation"). By
"transparently white," Flagg refers to the tendency for embedded white prefer-
ences to appear as neutral-whiteness being transparent or invisible as a racial
identity to most whites. See id. 968-73.
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people of color. Flagg's critique reveals the types of substantive bias inher-
ent in process-based approaches.
The pluralist interest impaired by process-oriented constitutional
law is the interest in antisubordinationist modes of analysis.
These days, all who enter the constitutional arena must speak the
processual language of institutional concerns. However, because
the process perspective systematically exerts pressure in the direc-
tion of the colorblindness interpretation of equality, the arena is
not equally hospitable to all points of view. Those for whom mat-
ters other than institutional legitimacy take priority must never-
theless confront the substantive "tilt" associated with the process
perspective. 31
Adopting a process-based approach to the national security law context
renders a similar "substantive tilt" insofar as concerns for institutional le-
gitimation displace anti-subordinationist principles that would prioritize
remediation of group-based harms imposed on Muslims, Arabs, South
Asians and other demonized minorities.
Issacharoff and Pildes developed their argument for the process-
based approach by looking at Civil War era opinions in Ex parte Milligan,
3 2
the case that famously overturned President Lincoln's suspension of
habeas corpus by ruling in favor of a detained individual's right to trial in
a civilian court. Two positions emerge from their reading of Milligan. The
majority opinion in the case represents an absolutist rights-oriented view
for Issacharoff and Pildes that "transformed the case into a challenge to
the power of the entire national government, even when acting in concert,
to invoke emergency powers (such as suspension of habeas corpus) and
re-calibrate the rights of individuals during wartime."3 3 A concurring
opinion signed by the remaining four judges contains what Issacharoff
and Pildes see as the better, pragmatic approach that will become the
dominant view.3 4 Under the concurring opinion's approach, "[t]he con-
31. Id. at 977 (footnote omitted).
32. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
33. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 12.
34. Issacharoff and Pildes claim that the Milligan rights-oriented majority po-
sition was subsequently discredited by public reaction to the case. Their reading of
this reaction skews in favor of their conclusions regarding the superiority of what
they see as the more pragmatic process-based approach. They claim that public
hostility toward Milligan was strictly a result of the decisive role the Court may have
been reserving for itself in subsequently adjudicating Reconstruction laws that in-
fringed on individual liberties. Had the Court adopted the concurrence's process-
based approach, Issacharoff and Pildes argue, the public would not have reacted in
outrage: "None of this [outrage] had been necessary, because had the Court taken
the pragmatic, institutional-process approach of the concurrence, the decision
would have been widely accepted." Id. at 14. Given the partisan basis of the pub-
lic's outrage, generally, Southerners loved Milligan, Northerners did not, it seems
unlikely that the choice of a theory of national security constitutionalism would
have stemmed the critical tide. The Civil War-era Court is, in fact, an example of
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stitutional inquiry . .. started and finished with what authority Congress
had given to President Lincoln." 35
Issacharoff and Pildes read the history of national security law, up
through the present war on terrorism, as the triumphant trajectory of po-
litical process-oriented judicial review of security-related exercises of state
power. They then turn to normative concerns, looking at the slipperiness
of process-based review and the willingness of courts to engage in dubious
interpretive gymnastics in order to find congressional authorization for
executive actions.36 The authors also examine problems within the politi-
cal process itself, such as the possibility that Congress might simply abdi-
cate to the executive on matters of national security. The most notorious
and daunting political problems of any process-based approach, the pro-
tection in the political process of discrete and insular minorities men-
tioned in Carolene Products' famous Footnote Four, do not push Issacharoff
and Pildes to qualify their faith in process-based institutional balancing. 37
For example, the authors seek to attenuate civil liberties concerns by
arguing that the executive branch may itself "internalize civil libertarian
values." They base this argument in a comparison of the civil liberties
records from World War I and World War 11.38 They conclude that pro-
tection of dissident speech was dramatically improved in World War II in
large part because executive branch officials, like Attorney General Fran-
cis Biddle, resisted the repressive impulses of the President.39 Issacharoff
and Pildes, however, do not discuss the Japanese internment during World
War II as part of this comparison. Foregrounding the internment would
undercut their hypothesis, illustrating the problems of relying on process-
based approaches in contexts involving a political environment biased
against a demonized and subordinated minority. Within the executive
branch, individual members of the Justice Department, including Biddle,
an institution trapped by what we today might place broadly into the category of
identity politics. The partisan reactions to Milligan, and the divisions within the
Court over which model to apply, suggest that the choice between individual
rights-based absolutism and the institutional-process approach is much more polit-
ically fraught than Issacharoff and Pildes would suggest. It is precisely in this politi-
cal dimension that the process-based model requires further elaboration and
substantive foundation.
35. Id. at 13.
36. See id. at 36-40 (noting, for example, that Congress tends to rubber stamp
executive decisions and process-based review "turn[s] judicial review, which pig-
gybacks onto the congressional role, also into a meaningless rubber stamp").
37. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
38. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 40-41 (using World War II
examples of judicial resistance of executive actions to theorize that civil liberties
can be protected).
39. See id. ("[T]he Attorney General, Francis Biddle, himself stepped in the
civil liberties tradition, managed to resist most of President Roosevelt's insistent
demands to 'indict the seditionists.").
[Vol. 50: p. 10731086
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss4/20
THE DEVIL WE KNOW
had indeed opposed the internment. 40 These would-be purveyors of the
executive branch's "internalized civil libertarian values," however, were
easily swept aside by the racist impulse that took hold of the political
process.
4 1
Issacharoff and Pildes present the Japanese internment as the by now
familiar token of transcended/benighted past and a redeemed/enlight-
ened present. They write: " [F] ar from legitimating repressive wartime pol-
icies, [Korematsu's] only doctrinal role has been as a symbol of what ought
to be avoided in political practice and constitutional law."'4 2 The case of
Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 43 published the same day as Korematsu and provid-
ing the empty gesture of invalidating the then terminating internment of
loyal Japanese American citizens, enjoys a certain position of privilege in
such revisionist treatments of the internment. Endo is seen as a corrective
to the rest of the internment jurisprudence. 44 Issacharoff and Pildes con-
clude that "the idea that Korematsu and its inherent racialism represent the
full story about the judicial encounter with the World War II internment
of the Japanese is a creation of the narrative American constitutional law
has come to tell about this episode. That conventional account ignores
[Endo] ."45
Despite this relatively rosy assessment of the Court's role in the intern-
ment cases, Issacharoff and Pildes are willing to make no "historical/de-
scriptive" case for a stronger judicial role in providing substantive
constitutional oversight for political branch exercises of security powers.
They conclude that "American courts have viewed the costs of putting
judgment of these [substantive] questions into the hands of courts to out-
40. See Gott, supra note 16, at 224-35 (mentioning J. Edgar Hoover, John Mc-
Cloy, Oscar Cox, Ben Cohen and Joseph Rauh as some originally opposed to
internment).
41. See id. (articulating how severe racism and racialization helped cause shift
in policy towards favoring internment).
42. Id. at 23 (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
43. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
44. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1933, 1939
(2003) (placing Endo decision on par with Korematsu as "part of constitutional
law").
45. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 21. Issacharoff and Pildes refer in
their work to Gudridge's revisionist essay on Endo that somewhat cryptically sees
the case as depicting "a legal space within which the unconstitutional and the ex-
traconstitutional are inexpressible." Gudridge, supra note 44, at 1967. Gudridge
concludes that Korematsu must be viewed in light of his reading of Endo in order to
comprehend the proper and minimalist way that constitutional law can operate in
the face of "felt necessity." Endo/Korematsu signal for Gudridge a "doubled legal
consciousness," a hopeful oscillation between "originating commitment," on the
one hand, and necessity, on the other. Gudridge sees this way of appreciating
Endo as necessary to keeping alive in exigent contexts "readable signs of the contin-
uing impact of constitutional sensibility, of at least the elementary patterns of con-
stitutional law." Id. at 1968. Gudridge does not endorse the institutionally-
oriented process-based reading of Endo defended by Issacharoff and Pildes, but
instead asserts that Endo "sounds in constitutional law." Id. at 1954.
2005] 1087
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weigh the benefits of leaving these freighted questions in the joint hands
of the legislature and executive." 46 The remaining structure of national
security constitutionalism renders these exception decisions substantively
unrestrained by providing only the guarantee of "bilateral review of
claimed states of emergency.
47
A different historical/descriptive case, however, can certainly be
made even if one does not think that the Court performed admirably in
the internment cases. That is, the Court's approach in the internment
cases may not be as substantively hollowed-out as Issacharoff and Pildes
indicate. Several of the Justices' opinions were, in fact, quite explicit in
discussing the racist roots of the curfew, exclusion and detention orders.
None of the opinions expressly sets aside as substantively irrelevant the
acknowledged problems of the internment's racial injustices. It is true
that by choosing to support political branch and military abuses the cases
did not afford decisive weight to the substantive issues of racial injustice.
But, it is a stretch to read the various opinions and conclude that Justices
did not undertake substantive review of the internment. The Court's sub-
stantive baseline was indeed "infernal," 48 but seeing the internment cases
as precedents for substantively unrestrained political decisionism really re-
quires expunging the glaring racial dimensions of the Court's delibera-
tions. It is more descriptively accurate to say that the Court simply
constructed the particular norms it applied (due process, equal protec-
tion) in a way that allowed it to valorize the political branch narrative re-
garding the necessity of internment, regardless of how this burdened
Japanese Americans.
At bottom, such readings of the internment cases acquiesce in the
political branches' absolute right to decide the exception, even on racist
grounds. Such readings necessarily avoid engaging fully the racialized na-
ture of the internment. Contrast these readings, however, with that of-
fered by Jerry Kang who tempers any praise one might be tempted to
extend to the Endo Court with the terse observation that Endo functioned
mainly to absolve the political branches of any "sins" related to the intern-
ment.49 Kang's reading of Endo is integral to his critical understanding of
the wartime Court as a "full participant in the internment machinery."
The machinery metaphor Kang chooses is poignant, suggesting something
systemic and heartless, perhaps also simultaneously "democratic" (as in au-
tocratic "machine politics") in a uniquely American sense. It conjures an
46. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 25.
47. Id.
48. See Gudridge, supra note 44, at 1934 (setting forth term "informal
baseline").
49. SeeJerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA
L. REv. 933, 963 (2004) ("[T]he two political branches of the federal government
were absolved of any sins, and an obscure, long-since dissolved agency ended up
holding the bag.").
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image that should trouble those using the internment to support process-
based decisionism.
Kang's socio-legal synthesis of the internment cases differs substan-
tially from revisionist readings such as that offered by Isaacharoff and
Pildes. Kang argues that the Court used judicial tactics and timing to al-
low the internment to proceed, while avoiding constitutionally sanctioning
the indefinite detention of loyal citizens. Moreover, Endo itself was an
"epic whitewash," providing rhetorical cover for the racist impulse at the
heart of the internment.50 "Notwithstanding the harsh and public reality
of biased, negative racial meanings influencing the decision-making pro-
cess of the political branches, the [Endo] Court explained that it could not
possibly assume that this was so.
51
Kang shows that rationalizations based on "minimalist virtues," princi-
ples that support judicial restraint, are inapplicable to the internment ju-
risprudence. 52 Minimalist virtues share, with process-based theories, the
presumed advantages of furthering democratic accountability and avoid-
ing either legitimation of unconstitutional practices or "unrealistic," politi-
cally inexpedient, judicial assertions of principle. Neither democratic
accountability nor political expediency explains to Kang the Justices' fail-
ure to use judicial review decisively in negating the internment orders.
Kang shows that the Justices were not concerned with democratic ac-
countability, 5 3 much less the protection of discrete and insular minorities
in the democratic process.54 The judicial approach to the internment
cases "in no way promoted democratic decision making and accountabil-
ity, especially if we understand democracy as more than simplistic max-
imization of majority preferences."55 The Court also did not "dodge" the
cases in a way that would be consistent with the political expediency prong
of the minimalist virtues. The Court segmented, and then upheld the con-
stitutionality of, various aspects of the internment. Indeed, Kang points
out that the Court did not seek to avoid legitimating the internment for
the simple reason that the Court may not have doubted the internment's
constitutionality. 5
6
50. See id. at 961 ("But in Endo, this otherwise reasonable interpretive practice
produced an epic whitewash.").
51. Id.
52. See id. at 965-75 (discussing "minimalist virtues"). "Minimalist virtues" is a
result of Kang's conflation of Alexander Bickel's notion of "passive virtues" and
Cass Sunstein's theory of "judicial minimalism." See id. at 965 (describing confla-
tion of theories). Such theories of judicial restraint are akin to process-based ap-
proaches in prioritizing responses to the counter-majoritarian dilemma.
53. Kang points out that, "[a]t various points in the wartime cases, the Court
was invited to strike down aspects of the internment on grounds that the military's
actions had not been authorized by the President of Congress." Id. at 967-68.
54. Kang emphasizes that "the sort of democracy that was realistically in play
[at the time of the internment] was tyranny of the majority." Id. at 969.
55. Id. at 970.
56. See id. at 971 ("Further, the Court did not avoid the merits entirely by
employing some device such as standing, ripeness, mootness, or political question.
108920051
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In short, revisionist readings of the internment, which emphasize the
Court's "principled" democratic process-based or minimalist approach,
cannot redeem the internment as a model of national security law. The
internment cases should be canonized, but not as monuments to princi-
pled judicial behavior in national security contexts in which political
branch demonization and repression of racialized "enemy groups" has
been a recurring problem. 57 What can redeem the internment disaster
for legal liberalism is an appreciation of how either process-based ap-
proaches or judicial minimalist values must be subjected to an effects-ori-
ented substantive baseline that provides the fullest possible protection
from, and promise of remedy for, group-based harms that accrue to ra-
cially subordinated groups.5 8 Kang invokes, for example, the deep princi-
ples of equal protection that do not allow for the trading of "outsiders"
rights for the sake of benefits (including systemic legitimation) that accrue
primarily to insiders. 59 Whether the Court in the internment cases fol-
lowed a judicial minimalist or process-based script, it effectuated a trans-
parently white jurisprudence. This is a legacy that cannot be transcended
through revision, but which should instead sustain a non-negotiable anti-
subordinationism at the core of U.S. national security law.
C. Sub-Constitutionalism: A Process-Based Hybrid
Bruce Ackerman proposes the creation of an "emergency constitu-
tion" as a way to manage the problem of security threats that do little to
threaten the state's existence but which readily turn the government into
the bane of civil liberties.60 Ackerman believes that our biggest problem is
not that government will be unable to withstand terrorist attacks, "but that
it will be too strong in the long run."6 1 Ackerman sees the present threat
from terrorism as creating a powerful "distinctive interest" that compels
the state to reassure its citizens that sovereignty is protected. Ackerman
sets out to accommodate the legal system to this emerging state impera-
tive, which he calls the "reassurance function."62
Instead, it segmented off easier aspects of the case and incrementally affirmed
their constitutionality.").
57. See Gott, supra note 16, at 269 (arguing for more fully racialized under-
standing of internment cases as important foreign affairs law precedent that would
lead to prioritization of anti-subordinationist commitments in field).
58. Sunstein would include an injustice exception to his minimalist principle.
See Kang, supra note 49, at 969.
59. See id. at 972 (explaining that systems which avoid legitimation "smacks
almost entirely of political expediency and almost nothing of principle").
60. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1040
(2004) (explaining constitutional challenge presented by terrorism and states' at-
tempts to protect their citizens).
61. Id.
62. See id. ("Government will not disintegrate in the face of a terrorist threat,
but politicians will have a powerful incentive to abuse the reassurance function.").
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Ackerman, even more forcefully than other accommodationists, ac-
knowledges the "distributional" problems his emergency constitution must
face as a result of prevailing demonologies that will identify and unjustly
target for abuse certain discriminated segments of the population. 63 The
primary bulwark that Ackerman's emergency constitution erects against
this kind of discrimination and abuse is a "supermajoritarian escalator"-a
requirement that the state's emergency powers be temporally limited
pending approval by larger legislative majorities. 64 This procedural cen-
terpiece, in a model otherwise mostly devoid ofjudicially enforceable sub-
stantive anti-subordinationist protections, would presumably give
significant "national minorities" a degree of voice and political recourse
against abuse.
65
Nonetheless, Ackerman seems resigned that minority demonization
may be an insurmountable problem in emergency contexts, even for his
supermajoritarian process. 66 He discusses two types of exemplary limit
cases-the Japanese internment and Palestinian intifada-as situations in
which both liberal judiciaries and supermajoritarian procedural safe-
guards might fail to insure fidelity to the principles of liberal democracy.
67
Ackerman believes that Korematsu and the internment illustrate the
strengths and weaknesses of relying on judicial review to limit governmen-
tal abuse. Even an avowed libertarian like Justice Black succumbed to
pressures in creating a paradigmatic case of the "permissive moment" in
common law approaches to policing the law/security boundary. 68 "De-
cades of revisionist activity" were required for the common law method to
redeem its mistake in Korematsu, and yet, Korematsu is still valid legal
precedent. 69
Ackerman doubts that the Court will have sufficiently internalized
post-internment moral and legal revisionism to resist a future program to
intern Arab-Americans in the war on terrorism.70 Thus, sharing a concern
with Tushnet and other accommodationists, Ackerman foresees that reli-
ance on the courts is likely to create the "normalization of emergency con-
63. See id. at 1048-49 (discussing drawbacks of Ackerman's proposed emer-
gency constitution).
64. See id. at 1047-49 (explaining theory of supermajoritarian escalator
principle).
65. See id. at 1048-49 (explaining benefits of supermajoritarian escalator prin-
ciple). Ackerman's model does include some basic substantive protections. See in-
fta text accompanying notes 78-82.
66. See Ackerman, supra note 60, at 1049 (explaining supermajoritarian esca-
lator as playing "greater or smaller role in checking the abuses that such [ant-
demonized minority] discrimination invites").
67. See id. at 104245 (providing examples of breakdown of constitution pro-
tections when terrorism is involved).
68. See id. at 104243 (finding Korematsu provides revealing examples of "both
the strengths and limits of a judge-centered approach").
69. See id. (describing Korematsu as "very, very bad law").
70. See id. at 1043 (questioning what court's response would be "if Arab-Amer-
icans are herded into concentration camps").
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ditions."7 1 His emergency constitution is designed to avoid the impossible
choice between a "lawless police state" (his characterization of the extra-
legal approach suggested by Tushnet and Oren Gross) and "legally nor-
malized oppression," which he believes results from common law's reli-
ance on judges in national security contexts. 72
Ackerman turns to the example of the Palestinian struggle to illus-
trate the limits of his own emergency constitution. 7 3 He surmises that the
"repressive forces that may be unleashed by a Palestinian intifada that con-
tinues at its present intensity for years and years" will not be checked, even
by his proposed emergency regime.7 4 The Palestinian intifada thus marks
the limit condition within which Ackerman's model can work. The recog-
nition at the heart of Ackerman's understanding of Korematsu and the Pal-
estinian intifada is that the law-security distinction collapses into
unprincipled decisionism, both for judges and Ackerman's temporally de-
limited supermajoritarian system, paradigmatically, at the intersection of
race and subordination.
Ackerman's appreciation of identity-contingent limits on liberal de-
mocracy's capacity to sustain a working law-security distinction compels
him to conceive of remedies for the resulting group-based injuries.75 Yet,
like other accommodationists, Ackerman falls short of integrating the
problem of group demonization and identity-based construction of secur-
ity threats into his accommodation of the reassurance function as a source
of state overreaching in times of crises. In other words, Ackerman neither
assesses the reassurance function, nor tailors his response to it in light of
his own anti-subordinationist analysis of liberal democracy's limited ability
to sustain a meaningful law-security distinction. Ackerman's emergency
constitution responds instead to a rather abstracted understanding of the
state's reassurance function, foregoing critical engagement with the cen-
tral subordinationist moment of extreme security-inflected exercises of
state power.
Ackerman targets what he identifies as "bad" emergency-related legal
structures. These are structures that "channel temporary needs for reas-
surance into permanent restrictions on liberty."7 6 Ackerman's model pe-
riodically and incrementally escalates to a maximum of eighty percent the
legislative majority needed to reauthorize emergency powers. 7 7 Failing
71. See id. (explaining "normalization of emergency conditions as the creation
of legal precedents that authorize oppressive measures without any end").
72. See id. at 1044-45 (discussing advantage of Ackerman's model over other
approaches).
73. See id. at 1045 (discussing Palestinian Intifada).
74. See id. at 1045 (conceding drawback of proposed emergency constitution).
75. See infra text accompanying notes 76-82.
76. See Ackerman, supra note 60, at 1045 (explaining "constitutional struc-
tures can perform a crucial channeling function").
77. See id. at 1047 (explaining framework of supermajoritarian escalator
model).
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such periodic reauthorization, the state's emergency powers-in particu-
lar its power of constitutionally unregulated detention-would lapse. Ack-
erman includes several basic substantive commitments in his model. 78 For
instance, states may not derogate, even in times of emergency, a few pri-
mary political rights and individual liberties that coincide with core inter-
national human rights protections, such as a ban on torture. 79 Certainly,
given the "discrete and insular" quality of societal minority groups demon-
ized by majorities and states, a more carefully tailored program of "anti-
demonization" protections is necessary.
Ackerman's model sets itself apart from other accommodationist
models in one aspect. Ackerman eloquently articulates his understanding
of the "crushing costs" that befall victims of unjust detentions. 80 In addi-
tion, he sees the "callousness" with which governmental actors respond to
"the hundreds or thousands of innocent men and women caught up in
antiterrorist dragnets." 8 1 His model, in contrast to some other accomoda-
tionist models, would provide mandatory monetary compensation for vic-
tims of national security power abuse. Ackerman extrapolates this remedy
from the Constitution's principle of just compensation and argues for af-
ter-the-fact payment for "takings" of liberty.8 2 It is interesting to contem-
plate extending Ackerman's thinking on just compensation to losses of
political or social capital. Applying a critical understanding of race-based
subordination to the model of human capital that Ackerman adopts would
allow for less literal or formalistic definition of the class of victims who
warrant protection and remedy.
II. PROGRESSIVE LEGALISM, RACE AND FoRmALisM
David Cole's important book Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Consti-
tutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism8 3 ("Enemy Aliens") offers a valuable
critique of the war on terrorism by blending libertarian commitments with
an awareness of the political and social dimensions of "enemy" construc-
tion behind the government's security-based restrictions.8 4 Cole has been
one of the most outspoken critics of the war on terrorism and is often
characterized as a civil libertarian. Yet, his previous work on race and class
in the criminal justice system places Cole in a unique relationship to civil
78. See id. at 1047 (explaining that "state of emergency then should expire
unless it gains majority approval").
79. See id. at 1058-59 (discussing necessary limitations of emergency powers).
80. See id. at 1062-63 (discussing issue of compensation of erroneously de-
tained individuals).
81. Id. at 1062.
82. See id. at 1063 (summarizing Ackerman's argument for providing mone-
tary compensation to detainees).
83. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003).
84. See generally id. (discussing thesis of Cole's book).
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liberties advocacy as someone committed to race-based critique. 85 More
strictly formalistic civil liberties advocacy, of the sort perhaps epitomized
by the American Civil Liberties Union, takes little to no account of the
underlying political and social context in choosing and defending clients
and causes. Debates over hate speech or pornography restriction have re-
vealed deep fault lines between, on the one hand, more formalistic liberta-
rian and, on the other, critical race and feminist projects. 86 Cole's work
embodies a progressive form of civil liberties advocacy, sharing certain
forms of analysis with formalist approaches to civil liberties protection,
while also seeking to take account of structural (social, economic and po-
litical) determinants of "unequal justice."
Were one to read but a single book on the legal problems arising
from the war on terror, it should probably be Cole's Enemy Aliens. The
book presents, in four parts, the argument against using national security
powers to force a constitutional accommodation to what the state per-
ceives or declares as necessary.8 7 First, Cole lays out the legal and policy
changes brought by September 11 and how these changes primarily
eroded the rights and liberties of non-citizens. 88 Second, he uses both
historical and contemporary evidence to show how security-related state
overreaching, which begins as repression affecting only non-citizens, usu-
ally turns into across-the-board retrenchment affecting citizens and non-
citizens alike.89 Third, Cole rebuts the consequentialist argument (that
liberty restrictions make us more secure) by showing the ways that the
double standards relied upon to strip "enemy" groups of their rights cause
a legitimacy crisis.90 This crisis makes it harder to police the terrorist
threats both at home and abroad. 9 1 Fourth, he presents the moral and
constitutional argument that our nation's liberal democratic commit-
ments require us to extend basic rights to non-citizens, even in times of
threats to national security. 9 2
85. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (1999) (arguing that administration of criminal law is
"predicated on the exploitation of inequality").
86. See, e.g., MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THE-
ORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (Robert W. Gordon & Mar-
garet Jane Rudin eds., 1993) (discussing debate between civil rights community
and civil liberties communities over First Amendment right to engage in hate
speech).
87. See COLE, supra note 83, at 7 (explaining that "central argument of this
book is that trading foreign nationals' liberties for citizens' security should be
resisted").
88. Id. at 17-82 (noting that, while most expressed willingness to sacrifice lib-
erties post-September 11, only seven percent of Amercian citizens felt practical
effect on rights).
89. See id. at 85-179.
90. See id. at 183-208.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 210-27.
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Consider how Cole presents the problem of what he calls "spillover
effects"; the process by which citizens' rights are negatively impacted by
restrictions originally targeted at non-citizens.93 In a sense, Cole's argu-
ment is a learned elaboration on the famous speech by Reverend Martin
Niem6ler, which preaches the principle of solidarity with oppressed
groups from a perspective of enlightened self-interest.9 4 This line of argu-
ment is an appeal to members of majorities, who may not be immediately
or significantly affected by selective state exercises of security power, to
beware lest their complacency in the face of others' civil liberties disasters
lead them to ruin.
It is difficult to judge whether reliance on such an argument is, in the
final analysis, proper to advocate for the interests of subordinated groups.
Nevertheless, one can see why these arguments make attractive additions
to the rhetorical arsenal of civil liberties defenders. In Reverend Niem6l-
ler's case, the poem had the virtue of tracking his experiences in Nazi
Germany and thus did not sacrifice verisimilitude for moral force. The
problem with arguments for self-interest, however, is that they do not pro-
vide the basis for critique or resistance where the state actually burdens
outsider groups through exceptional exercises of security power. Self-in-
terest arguments fail to elucidate the specifically racialized quality of such
subordination, missing the tight articulation between security regimes and
racial formation.
Cole looks at Japanese internment to show how anti-alien bias ratio-
nalizes political repression, and that such repression eventually extends
from non-citizens to citizens.9 5 Cole concludes that the "internment
marked the extension to U.S. citizens of practices long imposed on for-
eign nationals, as the citizen/non-citizen divide was bridged by racial ani-
93. See id. at 75.
94. See id. (invoking Niem6ller speech in section titled "First They Came for
the Aliens"). There are various versions of Niem6ller's speech in circulation. The
one quoted below is taken from historian Harold Marcuse's web page dedicated to
reconstructing the "original" version of the speech. See Harold Marcuse, Martin
Niemoller's Famous Quotation: "First they came for the Communists... ", at http://www.
history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/niem.htm#versions (last modified Sept. 17,
2004).
First they came for
the socialists, and I did not speak out
because I was not a socialist.
Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I did not speak out
because I was not a trade unionist.
Then they came for the Jews,
and I did not speak out
because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for me,
and there was no one left to speak for me.
Id.
95. See COLE, supra note 83, at 85.
20051 1095
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mus."
9 6 He shows that the non-citizen/citizen bridging device of racial
animus is analogous to the bridging device of "politics" used during the
anti-communist backlash of the McCarthy era, when "radical citizens were
targeted in much the way that radical foreign nationals had been targeted
earlier."97
Cole's decision to cast anti-Japanese or anti-Asian racial animus in the
role of a bridging device is necessitated by his focus on alienage (and the
spillover effect into the category of citizen) as the operative category of
analysis. Of course, another way of viewing the relationship is to see ra-
cism as the factor-making that made alienage all but irrelevant in the case
of Japanese-Americans who were interned en masse. A more focused criti-
cal race analysis of the internment would be helpful, for example, if Cole
were trying to make a cautionary argument about a "racial spillover effect"
that could impact other racial minorities.9 8 Instead, the analysis must ef-
fectively de-emphasize the racial contingency of the internment and em-
phasize the general problem of anti-immigrant sentiment in the United
States. 99 Cole chose not to locate the roots of the internment in the cen-
tury of intense and violent anti-Asian history, an especially prominent fea-
ture of the social formation of the western region states from which the
internees were expelled. Instead, Cole argues that the roots of the intern-
ment go back to the period before the first wave of Asian immigrants ar-
rived in the United States, to the post-American revolutionary period and
the passage of the first in a series of anti-alien security laws, the Alien and
Sedition Acts. 100
Cole uses this long history of anti-alien security law to support his
point about the easy bridgability of the non-citizen/citizen divide:
The Enemy Alien Act (in force at the time of the interment) is by
definition predicated on a sharp distinction between citizens and
foreign nationals; its very justification is the enemy alien's foreign
nationality. Given the centrality of "alien-ness" to the concept,
one might think that this power would pose little threat to the
liberties of U.S. citizens. In World War II, however, the military
extended the Act's philosophy to Japanese-Americans through
the prism of race.101
It is certainly true that the military, especially the lawyers defending
the internment, used racial stereotypes and racist propaganda to advocate
96. Id. at 86.
97. Id. at 86-87.
98. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral
Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 851 (2003) (arguing that govern-
ment's post-September 11 actions have aroused nativist passion, which has nega-
tively impacted non-Arab groups of immigrants such as Latinos).
99. See COLE, supra note 83, at 90.
100. See id. at 90.
101. Id. at 95.
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the internment of Japanese Americans. 10 2 The lesson Cole draws from
the internment about the easy slide from repression of non-citizens to re-
pression of citizens overstates any role the formal citizen/non-citizen dis-
tinction played in the unfolding of events. Chief Justice Rehnquist has
opined that the internment cases were soundly decided insofar as the gov-
ernment repression only targeted non-citizens. 10 3 The ChiefJustice's line-
drawing is, in reality, in the spirit of after-the-fact apologia. Moreover, it is
part of his attempt to push United States national security law toward a
more unilateral executive model, or at least toward a model of limited
judicial review.1 0 4 As Cole points out, at the time, the Court "made little
reference to the fact that citizens' rights were at issue."
1 0 5
In fact, the decisive line-drawing at the time of the internment was
racial, as evidenced by the fact that none of the other non-racially demon-
ized groups of enemy aliens (in particular Germans and Italians) faced the
kind of group-based treatment that the Japanese faced. 10 6 Cole's desire to
turn the internment into an objective lesson for citizens who may not be
worried about the government's repressive policies in the war on terrorism
brings him to the problematic theoretical interface of immigration and
race. He concludes that a "close interrelationship between anti-Asian ra-
cism and anti-immigrant sentiment made the transition from enemy alien
to enemy race disturbingly smooth."1 0 7 Articulating the racial dimension
of the interment as bound up in the general interrelationship between
alienage and race elides the lesson of scholarship that has shown how
Asians as a group have been specifically "raced" through an othering pro-
cess that uniquely ties racial difference to permanent "foreign-ness." 10 8
This foreign-ness is not exhausted by, or subsumable to, the legal category
of alienage with which Cole works. It is instead an aspect of racial forma-
102. See Gott, supra note 16, at 225-45 (describing legal and political climate
of Japanese internment during World War 11).
103. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAws BUT ONE: CMVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME 209-11 (1998) (explaining that distinctions between Japanese and other
aliens were legally sufficient to support varied treatment of these alien groups dur-
ing World War II).
104. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2707 (2004) ("From this point forward,
federal courts will entertain petitions from these prisoners [foreign nationals in
Guantanamo], and others like them around the world, challenging actions and
events far away, and forcing the courts to oversee one aspect of the Executive's
conduct of a foreign war.").
105. COLE, supra note 83, at 97-98.
106. See id. at 95 (acknowledging that "[i]t is no accident that the enemy alien
concept was extended only to Japanese-Americans. German-Americans and Italian-
Americans were spared such treatment, although citizens of these backgrounds
often had their loyalty challenged in less categorical ways. The justification for
targeting only the Japanese was avowedly racist and had deep roots.").
107. Id. at 97.
108. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, "Foreign-ness" and Asian American Identities: Yellowface,
World War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAc. AM.
LJ. 1 (1996) (describing global "Orientalism" and its impact on Asian-Americans
living in United States).
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tion; a distinct category of analysis that relates only orthogonally to the
legal category of alienage.
The lesson Cole draws from what I refer to below as "the internment
this time" 0 9 parallels the one he draws from the historical cases. Cole
emphasizes that the government's targeting of innocent foreign national
Arabs and Muslims on the basis of "ethnic stereotyping" has extended
"anti-alien measures to U.S. citizens through the prisms of race and politi-
cal association."' 10 In sum, the argument Cole presents is designed to
convince non-Arabs and non-Muslims ("citizens") that they should reject
the government's racist double standards in the war on terrorism. This
argument uses a formal, de-racialized and alienage-based understanding
of the discrimination involved in the government's policies to depict the
danger of a spillover effect that might eventually impact citizens.
Karen Engle has written a thoughtful article discussing how historical
constructions of "good aliens" and "bad aliens," long operative in the semi-
otics of immigration law, have affected the war on terrorism.1" Engle's
article, like Cole's book, relies on alienage and signifying practices affect-
ing immigrants generally to mount an argument about the manipulated
legitimation of the war on terrorism. 112 Engle identifies three parameters
by which bad aliens have been signified in the past: national origin, race/
ethnicity and political identity. These categories are deployed by the state
as part of a legitimating dynamic through which both citizens and aliens
are constructed and disciplined to support the war on terrorism. 113
Engle rejects the position forwarded by Leti Volpp and others who
have supported a race-based critique of the war on terrorism and its effects
on Muslims, Arabs and South Asians. Engle writes:
I maintain that individuals thought to occupy the category of
Muslim or Arab are not automatically placed into the bad cate-
gory .... Thus, the war on terrorism is not simply a war on Mus-
lims, and it is not a holy war. To the contrary, it largely attains
legitimacy by presuming and relying on the existence of a cate-
gory of good Muslims, both within the United States and abroad.
The United States of the twenty-first century maintains an iden-
tity as a multicultural, (neo)liberal and tolerant state. 114
109. For a further discussion of this reference, see infra Section III and ac-
companying footnotes regarding racialization of national security.
110. COLE, supra note 83, at 104.
111. See Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the
War on Terrorism, 75 U. COLO. L. Rzv. 59, 61 (2004) (describing how "good alien"/
"bad alien" distinction serves as "organizing structure" in war on terrorism).
112. See id. at 109 (arguing that patriotism of "Good Muslims" legitimizes war
on terrorism).
113. See id. (explaining how "Muslims are disciplined into 'choosing' the
good, thereby creating a population that supports the United States in its war
against terrorism at home and abroad").
114. Id. at 62 (footnotes omitted).
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Engle's focus on the semiotics of war-on-terrorism legitimation centers the
problem of explaining Islamophilic and Arab-friendly pronouncements
made by many of those waging the war on terrorism. This centering, how-
ever, also leads to a certain leveling of the historical record regarding the
nation's anti-immigrant discriminations. Engle posits a generalized pro-
cess through which bad aliens are constructed, thus creating analytical
equivalencies between race-based and other forms of anti-immigrant dis-
crimination, othering or demonization.1 15 Racial distinctions that more
or less create closed categories based on biology, phenotype or culture are
viewed together with more open-ended categorizations that allow for opt-
ing out by proving that a member of the otherwise suspect class can be
trusted or assimilated. 116 Engle sees pervasive race-based profiling in the
government's post-September 11 anti-terrorism campaign as only part of
the story, maintaining that "today's profiling [of Arabs and Muslims] is
both tolerated and even endorsed because it operates alongside an open
offer to those identified with profiled groups to demonstrate that they are
model members of their groups.""17
Engle, like Cole but for reasons different from his, understands the
war on terrorism from a similarly formal set of legal distinctions that ana-
lytically privileges categories of self and other resulting deductively from
the territorialized logic of the nation-state. Citizens and immigrants/
aliens are not categories that map linearly onto the discriminating logic of
racial formation. Similarly to Cole, Engle posits the problem of anti-Mus-
lim or anti-Arab animus as a function of the spillover effect from the bad
alien category that now affects all Muslims and Arabs regardless of
citizenship:
The perception of disloyal tendencies that define the bad alien
categories has bled over into the identification of bad citizens.
The fear that [Muslim/Arab] terrorists would naturalize in order
to undermine the system is perhaps not as strongly felt or ex-
pressed as it was in the 1950s. In fact, little distinction seems to
have been made between United States-born and naturalized citi-
zens in the internal war on terrorism. Rather, regardless of birth,
Muslims and Arabs form most of the suspect class." 
8
Engle's reliance on the formal categories of immigration law, aggre-
gating aliens and citizens, respectively, as classes even while impressively
teasing out the different ways good and bad aliens are constructed from
within the same category, leads to a displacement of the racial dimensions
of the war on terrorism. What might be better understood as an irreduci-
115. See id. at 64 (discussing effect on immigration in creating bad aliens).
116. See id. at 87-88 ("Thus the war on terrorism oscillates between profilingjustified by security concerns on one hand and insistence and reliance upon exis-
tence of Good Muslims on the other.").
117. Id. at 94.
118. Id. at 98.
109920051
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ble "racing" of Arabs and Muslims, accompanied by rather transparent
and bad-faith official recitation of a multicultural mantra, is submerged
analytically in the same way that the acceptance of alienage and nationality
categories in immigration law discussions generally may elide the racial-
ized nature of the immigration law regime. 119
To be clear, neither Cole nor Engle is unaware or denies that racism
operates to the detriment of immigrants of color, or Arabs and Muslims
(non-citizen or citizen). 1 20 But for both, race is folded into a critique that
draws conceptual and rhetorical force from formal immigration and alien-
age law categorizations. It is clear that these approaches are not as anti-
thetical to group-based analyses (or remedies) as purely formalistic
understandings of civil liberties that often, in categorical fashion, exclude
underlying anti-subordinationist concerns involving group differentiation
and group-based power imbalances. Yet, in seeking, as perhaps in Cole's
case, to appeal to the relatively non-impacted group of white citizens, and
in Engle's case, to explain the apparent contradiction between the racist
"walk" and multicultural "talk" of the war on terrorism, formal categories
of immigration law displace racial subordination as the critical center of
gravity.
III. THE INTERNMENT THIS TIME
Huey (reading from newspaper): Newsweek has confirmed
through an exhaustive national poll that Black Americans are no
longer America's most hated group. The results do not come as a
surprise to many experts, who have observed a dramatic change
in Americans' profiling and discrimination patterns since Sep-
tember 11 th. The last ethnic groups to remove Black Americans
from the top spot were the Japanese and the Japanese-Ameri-
cans, who had a brief but memorable run at the top in the early
1940s.
Caesar: I'm so proud ... 121
How does the post-September 11 treatment of Arabs, Muslims and South
Asians in the United States compare with the internment of the Japanese
in World War II? Asking this question obviously places the present discus-
119. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy
Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000
U. ILL. L. REv. 525 (2000) (explaining article's thesis).
120. See Engle, supra note 111, at 97 (noting different treatment received by
three United States citizens). White "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh was
quickly indicted and allowed to plea bargain out after his capture in Afghanistan;
Saudi-born Yasser Hamdi has been held incommunicado since his capture and;
Puerto Rican descended Jose Padilla has also been held incommunicado since his
apprehension in Chicago. She indicates that the identity-based distinctions among
the three men as the basis for their differential treatment are "difficult to ignore."
See id. (discussing varied treatment of these three United States' citizens).
121. Aaron McGruder, The Boondocks, Nov. 8, 2001.
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sion in a particularly compelling comparative moral and historical per-
spective. Still, the question also suggests the broader problem of
comparatively assessing the racialization of Muslims, Arabs and South
Asians in the United States. Some may be quick to conclude that the his-
torical internment of Japanese Americans and the internment this time
are categorically distinct cases, notwithstanding the thousands of innocent
Muslims, Arabs and South Asians who have been detained in the war on
terrorism. Yet, close observers, such as Hamid Khan of the South Asian
Network in Los Angeles, see the current trauma as evincing aspects of
both an actual and a virtual internment. 12 2 Khan observes that, in addi-
tion to the actual detentions, Arabs, Muslims and South Asians are under-
going an internalized internment, resulting from a realistic fear of
government repression and a sense of betrayal and besiegement as a de-
spised minority group in U.S. society. 1 23 Moreover, Khan believes that the
internment this time, like the Japanese internment, must be understood
in the context of a longer history of racialized subordination of the af-
fected groups. 12 4
The analysis presented here is not intended to arrive at any "final"
assessment on the status of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians in the United
States. That the processes of racialization have affected these groups seems
certain, but how to understand the groups' racial positionality relative to
the other groups of color in the United States remains an open ques-
tion.125 My goal in writing this section is modest. I want to suggest that
group-based subordination of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians bears a
strong enough family resemblance to other forms of race-based subordina-
tion to warrant "extraordinary consideration" in the national security law
debate. Derrick Bell's famous Space Trader parable depicted members of
the white establishment as having at least to acknowledge that their desire
to trade African-Americans to the extraterrestrial invaders might run afoul
122. Hamid Khan, Remarks at LatCrit IX Conference Plenary Panel on Ter-
rorism and Culture (May 1, 2004) (discussing Khan's primary argument).
123. See id. (discussing treatment of Arabs, Muslims and South Asians in
United States).
124. See id. (analogizing internal internment of Arabs, Muslims and South
Asians to Japanese internment during World War II). Clearly, no "formula" strictly
induced from the historical experiences of the groups of color in the United States
is likely to prove an apt metric by which to assess either the harms currently being
incurred by Muslims, Arabs and South Asians in the United States, or the nature of
those groups' racialized status. Yet, Sucheng Chan's work on Asian Americans pro-
vides a useful template for understanding the racialization of outsider groups
targeted with a combination of racial, xenophobic and ideological animus. See gen-
erally SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY (ThomasJ. Arch-
deacon ed., 1991). See infra text accompanying notes 269-71.
125. See MICHAEL OMI & HowARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990S 162 n.3 (Michael W. Apple ed., 2nd ed.
1994) (tracing development of race theory) (citations omitted).
29
Gott: The Devil We Know: Racial Subordination and National Security Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
of equal protection principles. 126 Similarly, members of today's security
law and policy intelligentsia should be constrained to square their anti-
terrorism gambits with group-based justice considerations regarding the
status of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians. Of course, the hope here is also
that such considerations might render the trading away of these groups'
interests less likely, a significant, if wishful, deviation from Bell's grim
script.
A. Racialization of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians Before September 11
Scholarship prior to September 11 on the status of Muslims, Arabs
and South Asians in the United States presented differing views on the
fundamental question of whether these groups were "melting" into the
mix of white ethnic groups, or whether a more permanent racialized out-
sider status was taking shape.1 27 The argument for applying what Omi
and Winant refer to as the European "immigrant analogy"1 28 seemed war-
ranted in light of the legal classification of Muslims, Arabs, and South
Asians as white. As early as 1909, a federal judge declared that a Syrian/
Arab applicant met the statutory requirement of whiteness for naturaliza-
tion eligibility. 129 In 1914, the Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclu-
sion.130 Additionally, the census bureau classified Arabs and Muslims as
white or Caucasian 3 1 and the federal government has generally refused
to include Arab or Muslim groups among those discriminated minorities
considered eligible for affirmative action in contracting. 13 2
Nevertheless, the analogy between Muslims, Arabs and South Asians,
on the one hand, and European immigrants, on the other, appears
strained in light of evidence showing more ambiguous treatment afforded
these groups under the law. In the context of naturalization, not all
judges agreed that Muslims, Arabs and South Asians should be classified as
white, and some judges refused them access to citizenship through natu-
126. See DERRICK BELL, The Space Traders, in FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 158-94, 191 (1992) (discussing constitutional
implications of parable).
127. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 125, at 18 (describing how immigrant
groups were "transformed, if hardly melted").
128. See id. at 17 (noting similar treatment of European immigrants and racial
minorities).
129. See In re Najour, 174 F. 735 (N.D. Ga. 1909) (concluding that Syrians
belong to "what the world recognizes, as the white race").
130. See In re Dow, 226 F. 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1915) (holding that term "white
persons" includes Syrians, Armenians and Parsees); see also Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F.
Supp. 941, 942 (D. Mass. 1944) (finding that "Arab passes muster as a white
person").
131. See Helen Hatab Samhan, Not Quite White, in ARABS IN AMERICA: BUILDING
A NEW FUTURE 209-26, 213 (Michael W. Suleiman ed., 1999) [hereinafter ARABS IN
AMERICA] (noting census bureau's pre-World War II treatment of Arabs).
132. See id. at 218-21 (stating that federal guidelines place Arabs and other
persons with Middle Eastern origins in same "white category" as European
majority).
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ralization. 1 33 More recently, in at least one case, the Small Business Ad-
ministration (SBA) recognized the discrimination claim of a Palestinian
American contractor and included his company in the group of minority
contractors eligible for affirmative action in federal contracting.1 34 In ad-
dition, in 1987, the Supreme Court held that ethnic groups, such as Arabs,
could bring section 1981 civil actions for discrimination. 13 5 Last, San
Francisco included Arabs in the city's affirmative action program.1
36
Scholars familiar with such legal ambiguities and other mixed signals sent
from U.S. society to Muslims, Arabs and South Asians adopted the term
"invisible minority" to capture the groups' unique status.'
37
Ambiguity of racial status, resulting from some degree of mixed classi-
fication under the law, has been reinforced by the different waves of immi-
gration from the Middle East. Prior to World War II, for example, Arab
immigrants to the United States were mostly Christians from Syria and
Lebanon. Thereafter, immigrants came from North Africa and elsewhere
in the Arab World, and many were Muslim, a racialized religion.' 3 8 More-
over, "external" politics have had a unique impact on the status of Arabs
and Muslims in the United States. Fallout from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War
was an early watershed. This led to ostracism of Arabs and Muslims in the
United States but also provided the impetus toward those groups' forma-
133. See In reAhmed Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 841, 845 (E.D. Mich. 1942) (holding
that dark skinned Yemenite was ineligible for citizenship on grounds that he was
"part of the Mohammedan [sic] world"); Ex parte Dow, 211 F. 486, 487-89 (E.D.S.C.
1914) (discussing grounds for finding that Syrians are not within class of "white
persons" eligible for naturalization under statute); Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. 812, 816
(E.D.S.C. 1913) (holding that Syrian applicant did not meet racial definition of
white under 1790 Naturalization Act).
134. See Samhan, supra note 131, at 219 (citing contractor's documentation of
"specific economic disadvantages based on his national origin" as grounds for
SBA's decision).
135. See St. Francis v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 605 (1987) (concluding per-
son of Arabian ancestry may be protected from racial discrimination under
§ 1981).
136. SeeJason B. Johnson, Panel OKs Expansion of Preferences, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
16, 1998, at A17 (noting expansion of San Francisco's affirmative action program
to include Arab owned contracting companies).
137. See, e.g., Nadine Naber, Ambiguous Insiders: An Investigation of Arab Ameri-
can Invisibility, 23 ETHNIC AND RACIAL ST. 37, 56 (2000) (attributing Arab American
"invisibility" to difficulty of classifying Arab American community); see also Tayyab
Mahmud, Genealogy of a State-Engineered "Model Minority ": Not Quite/Not White South
Asian Americans, 78 DENY. U.L. REv. 657, 669-83 (2001) (reviewing history of South
Asians in United States and describing complexity of their "model minority" sta-
tus). But see Louise Cainkar, No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion After
September 11, MIDDLE EAST REP., Fall 2002, available at http://www.merip.org/mer/
mer224/224_cainkar.html (noting that September 11, 2001 marked end of Arab
invisibility).
138. See Suad Joseph, Against the Grain of the Nation-the Arab, in ARABS IN
AMERICA, supra note 131, at 257-71, 259 (observing that most pre-1960s Arab immi-
grants were Christian); Michael W. Suleiman, Introduction: The Arab Immigrant Expe-
rience, in ARABS IN AMERICA, supra note 131, at 1-21, 9 (1999) (discussing shift in
immigrant population).
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tion of a sense of collective identity.13 9 Michael Suleiman traces the rise of
"Arab-American pride" to the consequences of post-1967 Middle East
politics and U.S. foreign policy in the region. He notes that many Arabs in
the United States felt humiliated by the quick defeat of Arab armies and
resentful of the partiality that the U.S. government and its people showed
toward Israel. 140 Arab-Americans responded by organizing to fight the
negative stereotypes of Arabs that increasingly permeated U.S. media and
to make U.S. foreign policy more balanced in the Middle East.1
41
Thus, 1967 saw the creation of the Association of Arab-American Uni-
versity Graduates (AAUG), the first Arab American organization with "po-
litical-scholarly goals."' 42 This signaled the beginning of a new era of pan-
Arab organizing in the United States.143 Other groups followed, includ-
ing the National Association of Arab American and the American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee. 144 Despite the creation of such advocacy
organizations, negative images of Arabs and Muslims continued to domi-
nate media representations, 145 and many U.S. political figures, including
leaders of the otherwise relatively pluralistic Democratic Party, distanced
themselves from Arab and Muslim constituencies. Presidential candidates
McGovern, Carter, Reagan and Mondale also disassociated themselves
from Arab groups who offered support.1 4 6 Between forty and fifty-one
139. See Cainkar, supra note 137 (stating that many Arab-Americans re-
sponded to hostility from majority society by embracing Islamic identity); Joseph,
supra note 138, at 265 (characterizing 1967 Arab-Israeli war as major influence in
organization within Arab-American community); Suleiman, supra note 138, at 10-
15 (describing ongoing development of cohesive Arab-American community).
140. See Suleiman, supra note 138, at 10, 13 (noting Arab-Americans' disap-
pointment in American media's one-sided support of Israel).
141. See id. at 13 (describing Arab-American community's pro-active response
to discrimination).
142. See Joseph, supra note 138, at 265 (characterizing development of Arab-
American University Graduates (AAUG) as part of initiative to combat discrimina-
tory representations of Arabs).
143. See Suleiman, supra note 138, at 13 (noting establishment of political
groups devoted to defend Arab and Arab-American causes); see also Therese Saliba,
Resisting Invisibility: Arab Americans in Academia and Activism, in ARABS IN AMERICA,
supra note 131, at 304-19, 306 (describing Pan-Arab nationalism as "a strategy of
organizing diverse groups of Arabs against U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East
and racist media images of Arabs").
144. See Joseph, supra note 138, at 265-66 (discussing groups dedicated to
combating discrimination, including American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Commit-
tee (ADC), National Association of Arab American (NAAA) and Arab American
Institute (AAI)).
145. For a discussion of the negative television images of Arabs from the mid-
1970s through the mid-1980s, see generally Jack G. Shaheen, THE TV ARAB (1984).
146. SeeJoseph, supra note 138, at 266 (noting Democratic party's aversion to
political affiliation with Arab-American organizations). There are numerous other
examples of politicians returning donations from Arab or Muslim groups; see also
Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L.
295, 310-11 (2002) (stating that many political figures feared political conse-
quences of accepting contributions from Arab and Muslim American groups). In
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percent of the respondents in a survey in 1981 agreed that Arabs were
barbaric, cruel (44%), treacherous, cunning (49%), warlike, bloodthirsty
(50%), mostly anti-Christian (40%) and/or anti-Semitic (40%), and that
Arabs mistreated women (51%).147 Such studies, along with the openness
of anti-Arab or anti-Muslim bigotry, led observers to conclude that these
groups are among the few that are acceptable to hate openly.
14 8
The 1980s brought new levels of repression and violence. The FBI,
beginning with Nixon's Operation Boulder, had been spying on and in-
timidating Arab-Americans and their organizations since the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War ended. 149 Notwithstanding the onset of the United States' first
war on terrorism under Ronald Reagan and the new phase of Palestinian
activism in the occupied territories, the 1980s marked a period of height-
ened apprehension among Arabs and Muslims in the United States. The
FBI's 1980s counter-terrorism campaigns harkened back to the abuses of
its COINTELPRO programs that went far beyond law enforcement and
effected an anti-democratic sabotage of the civil rights movement. In
1987, the case of the so-called Los Angeles Eight revealed stunning abuses
of the political rights of Palestinians and supporters of the Palestinian
movement. The legal case involved the deportation of a group of seven
Palestinians and one Kenyan, who had been among the targets of a three-
year FBI "anti-terrorism" investigation. A report of the investigation's find-
ings showed that the FBI infiltrated and spied on the lawful, non-violent
political activities of these supporters of the Palestinian cause. No unlaw-
ful activities were ever reported, but the FBI agents recorded their con-
cern over the political opinions of those upon whom they spied.15 0 The
report concluded that the Palestinian activists were "anti-United States,"
and "anti-Israel."' 5 1 At the criminal trial, officials from INS and the FBI
both testified that the political beliefs of the defendants led to their arrest,
and FBI Director William Webster testified that these political beliefs
would have been protected if the defendants were U.S. citizens. 15 2
some cases, politicians alleged anti-Semitism on the part of the donors as the rea-
son for returning contributions. See id. (noting allegations that contributor made
anti-Semitic remarks). For a critical analysis of the politicization of charges of anti-
Semitism, see NORMAN FINKELSTEIN, BEYOND CHUTZPAH: ON THE MISUSE OF ANTI-
SEMITISM AND THE ABUSE OF HISTORY (forthcoming).
147. See Shelly Slade, The Image of the Arab in America: Analysis of a Poll on Ameri-
can Attitudes, 35 MIDDLE EASTJ. 143 (1981), cited in Lisa Suhair Majaj, Arab-American
Ethnicity: Locations, Coalitions and Cultural Negotiations, in ARABS IN AMERICA, supra
note 131, at 320-36, 321 (reporting results of survey).
148. See Majaj, supra note 147, at 321 (arguing that Arabs are still "safe to
hate" (quoting Slade, supra note 147, at 147)).
149. See Cainkar, supra note 137 (arguing that media openly advocates "de
facto criminalization" of both Muslim and Non-Muslim Arabs).
150. See DAVID COLE &JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF SECURITY, 35-48, 40 (2002).
151. See id.
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Susan Akram and Kevin Johnson discuss how the Palestinian Libera-
tion Organization (PLO) has been singled out for harsher treatment
under waiver of exclusion provisions in U.S. immigration law. 153 This se-
lective withholding of relief from exclusion for people involved with the
PLO, paired with the government's selective enforcement of deportation
proceedings, (the L.A. Eight case is one example), reveals a systemic clo-
sure against the legal membership of Arabs and Muslims who support the
Palestinian cause. Even after Congress eliminated ideological grounds for
exclusion from the law in 1990, the INS continued selectively to seek re-
moval of the L.A. Eight, now on grounds that they had engaged in "terror-
ist activity." 154 This concept was defined broadly enough to encompass
the range of peaceful and otherwise legitimate political activities in which
the defendants, as supporters of the Palestinian cause, had engaged.
15 5
Such governmental abuse of Arab-American political freedoms oc-
curred at the same time that the Alien Border Control Committee, a secret
government task force, was discussing plans for the mass incarceration of
"alien undesirables," mainly from Arab countries. There were even plans
for a special detention facility for such prisoners in rural Louisiana. 15
6
Moreover, the FBI abuses were mirrored by a string of violent attacks
targeting Arab activists in the mid-1980s, including the 1985 murder of
Arab-American Defense Committee Regional Director Alex Odeh in Los
Angeles, the 1986 double murder of renowned Islamic scholars and
spouses Lois Lamya and Ismail al-Faruqi in Philadelphia and the severe
beating of Moustafa Dabbas, publisher of the only Arabic-English newspa-
per in Philadelphia in 1986.157 The combination of governmental abuses
and acts of political violence had a chilling effect on Arab and Muslim
political activity at exacdy the time that these groups were most in need of
public representation. 158
The first Gulf War in 1991 only added to the dehumanization of
Arabs and Muslims, as reflected in the comments of General Norman
Schwartzkopf when he referred to Iraqis in Kuwait as not being part of the
"same human race we are." 159 Racial epithets were used to goad U.S.
153. See id. at 318 (noting that congress barred waiver of exclusion for PLO
representatives and officials).
154. See id. at 320.
155. See id. (noting that "terrorist activity" is broadly defined as "any act which
the actor knows, or should reasonably know, 'affords material support to any indi-
vidual, organization, or government in conducting a terrorist activity at any time'")
(citations omitted).
156. See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 150, at 39.
157. See Nabeel Abraham, Anti-Arab Racism and Violence in the United States, in
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB-AMERICAN IDENTITY 155-214, 163, 167, 173 (Ernest Mc-
Carus ed., 1994).
158. See Cainkar, supra note 137 (discussing Arab-American community's per-
ception that government action was intended to ensure that Arabs in United States
remain "politically voiceless").
159. R.W. Apple, Jr., Allies Destroy Iraqis' Main Force; Kuwait is Retaken After 7
Months, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al (quoting General Norman Schwarzkopf);
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troops forward in Iraq, and racist depictions of Iraqis appeared in U.S.
newspapers. 160 Mosques were bombed and Muslim schools, organizations
and businesses were vandalized. Hate crimes again surged against Arabs,
and the FBI engaged in intimidating interviews of Arabs in the United
States. 16 1 Sudden, event-related surges in hate crimes and anti-Arab and
anti-Muslim media representations became a recurring theme in the
1990s. This theme repeated itself after the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings. Thus, U.S. Arab and
Muslim communities' well-being became closely linked to events and
forces beyond their control. 16
2
Akram and Johnson chronicled the government's discriminatory
treatment of Arabs and Muslims in the context of immigration and refu-
gee/asylum law during the post-1967 period.163 This history demonstrates
the ways certain extreme forms of court-sanctioned state power, declared
available in immigration's unique environment of "plenary" congressional
and executive power, operate selectively to the detriment of Arabs and
Muslims.1 6 4 Race, foreign policy and outsider status come together in
shaping what amounts to one of the clearest examples of a legal regime of
exception within U.S. law. The evidence shows how political and ethno-
national factors shaped the legal system's treatment of Arabs and Palestini-
ans and their supporters.
see also Joseph, supra note 138, at 267-68. Schwarzkopf's comments referred to
Iraqis who he alleged were committing atrocities in Kuwait. Such allegations later
proved to be part of a propaganda campaign orchestrated to gain public support
for the war. See SUSAN L. CARRUTHERS, THE MEDIA AT WAR 41-43 (2000) (noting
that Kuwait employed services of public relations firm to convey victimized image
of Kuwait). But see id. (describing difficulty of verifying validity of accounts of
atrocities committed by Iraqis).
160. See Joseph, supra note 138, at 268 (citing examples of racism against
Arabs found in newspapers during Gulf War).
161. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 1991 Report on Anti-
Arab Hate Crimes: ADC Special Report 5 (1992); see also Sunday Morning: Prejudices
Against Arab-Americans in San Diego (reporting argument that scope of interviews
extend beyond security issues), CBS News Transcript of "Sunday Morning" (Jan.
27, 1991), available at LEXIS, News Library, CBS News Transcripts File.
162. Cainkar shows, for example, how the Palestinian community in Chicago
lost the cohering force of many of its local organizations coincident to the first
Gulf War. See Louise Cainkar, Ethnic Safety Net Among Arab Immigrants in Chicago, in
ARABS IN AMERICA, supra note 131, at 192-206, 198 (relaying plight of Arab Ameri-
cans in poverty in Chicago and lack of community organizations).
163. See Akram &Johnson, supra note 146, at 295-327 (summarizing pre-Sep-
tember 11 history of discrimination and demonization of Muslims and Arabs); Su-
san M. Akram, Orientalism Revisited in Asylum and Refugee Claims, 12 INT'LJ. REFUGEE
L. 7, 10 (2000) (describing how "neo-Orientalist" stereotypes damage refugee
rights of Arabs and Muslims); Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen
Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51, 61-70 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Scheherezade Meets Kajka] (presenting evidence of selective enforcement against
Muslims and Arabs of secret evidence, detention and removal procedures/
penalties).
164. Akram & Johnson, supra note 146, at 329
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Since 1996, the INS has been empowered to use secret evidence in
deportation cases. 165 Akram and Johnson were unable to locate any cases
where the secret evidence power in deportation cases had been asserted
against anyone other than Arabs and Muslims. 16 6 The secret evidence
cases targeted some particularly high profile political figures including a
Palestinian member of a University of South Florida academic think-tank
committed to addressing Middle East issues, and a democratically elected
member of the deposed Algerian Parliament.1 6 7 Repeatedly, the secret
evidence cases have revealed the INS's tendency to exaggerate claims.
Akram and Johnson state, "the government's claims in all of the cases
evaporated. No case has included sufficient evidence of terrorism-related
charges necessary tojustify detention. Besides the individual loss of liberty,
these cases have chilled Arab and Muslim speech." 168
Prior to September 11, Natsu Saito reviewed the secret evidence cases
involving detention, exclusion or deportation of Muslims or Arabs in the
United States and, already at that time, identified elements of racialization
in the disparate types of treatment Muslims and Arabs received in the post-
1996 legal environment. 169 Saito compares the racialization of Arabs and
Muslims to that of Asian Americans.
Just as Asian Americans have been "raced" as foreign, and from
there as presumptively disloyal, Arab Americans and Muslims
have been "raced" as "terrorists": foreign, disloyal, and immi-
nently threatening. 1
70
Saito's critical race-based reading of the legal record before September 11
shares theoretical space with the work of social scientists who have studied
Arabs and Muslims from a similar racialization perspective.
The types of bigotry, violence and governmental abuse experienced
by Arabs and Muslims after 1967 led social science scholars to reach differ-
ent conclusions about the nature of the animus facing these groups.
Nabeel Abraham identifies three different bases for the racism and vio-
lence affecting Arabs in the United States: ideology, nativism and jingo-
165. See generally Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (authorizing use of secret evidence in immigration
proceedings); see also Akram and Johnson, supra note 146, at 322-23 (reviewing
provisions contained in Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act that create
new procedures for detention and removal of "alien terrorists").
166. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 146, at 322 (arguing that INS applies
secret evidence rule exclusively to Muslims and Arabs). For a fully detailed ac-
count of the secret evidence cases, see Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kaka, supra note
163, at 70-108 (providing case-by-case analysis of secret evidence cases).
167. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 146, at 324-25 (describing secret evi-
dence proceedings involving prominent Arab figures).
168. Id. at 326.
169. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and
the "Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists" 8 AsiAN L.J. 1, 11-26 (2001).
170. Id. at 12.
1108 [Vol. 50: p. 1073
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss4/20
THE DEVIL WE KNOW
ism.17 1 The first category, ideological or political racism, refers to the
animus that attaches to Arab and Muslim support for the Palestinian
cause. Abraham argues that zealous support for Israel in the United States
has reinforced the perception that Arabs are terrorists, sowing fear and
suspicion toward Arab Americans. 172 Xenophobia fuels a second form of
racism, nativistic racism "based on perceived differences of race, culture,
ethnicity, and religion."173 This form is "homegrown" in the sense that it
does not rely on the Israel-Palestinian conflict for fuel. 174 It is more in
keeping with the anti-foreignness racism affecting Asian Americans, a mix
of anti-immigrant and racist animus. Finally, jingoistic racism "is a curious
blend of knee-jerk patriotism and homegrown white racism toward non-
European, non-Christian dark skinned peoples. It is a racism spawned by
political ignorance, false patriotism, and hyper ethnocentrism."1 75 The
latter is the type of racism that we observe when the United States govern-
ment defines a culturally or racially identified other as the enemy and mo-
bilizes the "nation" for war.
Over time, exclusionary actions had the effect of creating political
and cultural identities that Louise Cainkar characterizes as "transna-
tional." 17 6 Cainkar does not imply that Muslims and Arabs were able to
develop a uniquely post-national set of identities that could be seen as an
aspect of a broader, mostly positive trend toward the transcendence of the
national boundaries and identities. Rather, Cainkar asserts that Muslims
and Arabs developed transnational political and cultural identities in re-
sponse to "exclusion and denigration in American society."1 7 7 Cainkar's
work traces a transition over time in the dominant identity-axis of these
groups, from pan-Arab to nationalist to Muslim. This shift represents a
departure from the so-called ethnicity paradigm that analogizes the Arab
experience to white European experiences, which suggests the deepening
racialization of Muslims and Arabs. These changes not only reflect the
ongoing discrimination and exclusion from American society, but also the
ways in which the international context, particularly aspects of U.S. for-
eign policy, have created conditions of racial subordination for Arabs and
Muslims throughout the latter third of the twentieth century.
The result has been the formation within U.S. society of a racialized
and subordinated sub-group that has moved toward forming a non-assimi-
lated cultural and political identity in response to state and societal other-
ing processes. Therese Salibi concluded:
171. See Abraham, supra note 157, at 180-99.
172. See id. at 187-88.
173. Id. at 188.
174. See id. at 192-93.
175. Id. at 193.
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The racial transformation of Arab identity within [the United
States] has been influenced in large part by a second wave of
[pan-Arab oriented] Arab-American immigration, by the forma-
tion of Arab-American political organizations beginning in the
1960s, and by a growing resistance among these groups to U.S.
foreign policy in the Middle East. In the wake of the Persian Gulf
War, Arab-Americans emerged as a semi-legitimate minority
group. 178
In ways that parallel the experiences of the "unmeltable" peoples of
color in the United States, Muslims and Arabs do not have the same
choices that are available to whites to opt in or out of ethnic identities.
The boundary-marking differences that set these groups apart from whites
evince an immutability that has been the hallmark of enduring forms of
racialized group-based subordination. 179
B. State Action in the Racialization of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians
After September 11
Abundant evidence of post-September 11 racialization and abuse of
Muslims, Arabs and South Asians exists. In the brief space of this article, I
can only rehearse some of the most important points gleaned from the
various data sets currently available, highlighting evidence that suggests a
hardening of the diminished social and legal status of the affected groups.
Generally, the record shows that the government quickly extended its pre-
September 11 discrimination of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians through
the most vulgar forms of racial profiling. Law enforcement officials imme-
diately began apprehending racially profiled Muslim and Arabs. In early
November 2001, the reported number of detainees had reached almost
700.180 Subsequently, the Justice Department stopped reporting the de-
tention numbers. 18 1 Though the Justice Department resisted shedding
further light on its post-September 11 treatment of Arabs and Muslims,
David Cole estimated that the number of detentions in the United States
topped 5,000 by May 2003.182 Given that these detentions resulted from
racial profiling and programs like the selectively-targeted (anti-Arab and
anti-Muslim) Absconder Apprehension Initiative and the National Secur-
ity Entry-Exit Registration System ("NSEERS"), we may assume that nearly
all of the detained persons have been Arabs, Muslims or South Asians liv-
ing in the United States. 18 3
178. Saliba, supra note 143, at 310.
179. See Majaj, supra note 147, at 322-23 (noting that discrimination is prima-
rily process of "maintaining boundaries between 'us' and 'them"').
180. See COLE, supra note 83, at 25.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.; see also Council on American-Islamic Relations, The Status of Mus-
lim Civil Rights in the United States 2004 4-5 (2004) [hereinafter CAIR 2004
Report].
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The detention of thousands of racially-identified residents of the
United States, which includes both citizens and non-citizens of Arab, Mus-
lim or South Asian descent, represents the iceberg's tip in terms of state
abuses affecting these resident communities. For example, the NSEERS
program reportedly required more than 82,000 men and boys from coun-
tries with Muslim majorities to present themselves to the INS for special
registration. 184 Of those who complied, 13,000 remain eligible for depor-
tation for minor violations of immigration regulations.1 85 The NSEERS
program failed miserably as a tool to find terrorists. As a matter of com-
mon sense, it seems unlikely that anyone secretly planning a terrorist at-
tack, and someone vulnerable to deportation or detection through the
special registration program, would willingly show up at INS offices. In-
deed, none of the tens of thousands of people who registered, including
those charged with immigration violations, were charged with terrorism-
related offenses. 186
Even after the NSEERS was formally dismantled, it negatively im-
pacted Arab, Muslim and South Asian communities. 18 7 Louise Cainkar
placed NSEERS within a broader context of society's failure to accommo-
date Islam as a minority religion in the United States and concluded that:
Instead of helping to weave Muslims into the fabric of the nation
and garner their support in anti-terrorism efforts, recent govern-
ment policies [such as NSEERS] have singled them out as a group
that is dangerous and suspect, as potential subversives. By requir-
ing Muslim community organizations to use their resources on
self-defense-resources that have been substantially depleted by
government closures of charitable institutions and community
fears-programs focused on community building must be cut-
back or sacrificed. (Not unlike the resource drain caused by the
federal government's targeting of civil rights activists in the
1960's).188
The drain on community resources is especially significant in light of the
heightened need for community development of "political capital" among
184. See CAIR 2004 Report, supra note 183, at 4. Note that the National Secur-
ity Entry-Exit Registration System ("NSEERS") also targeted North Koreans in the
United States. See id. at 5.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Edward Hegstrom, Living with Fear, Mistrust, HOUSTON CHRON., June
13, 2004 (describing lasting fear and mistrust created among Arabs, Muslims and
South Asian in Houston by NSEERS, even after program's termination); Adam
Saytanides, Selective 'Registration: INS Asks Terrorists to Turn Themselves in, IN THESE
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2003, at 4-5 (describing "pall" that NSEERS created over Pakistani
community in Chicago). For a film documenting the human and community im-
pacts of NSEERS, see PATRIOT AcTs (Thirst Films 2004) (focusing on impact of
NSEERS on South Asian families in Chicago).
188. Louise Cainkar, Special Registration: A Fervor for Muslims, 7J. IsLAMic L. &
CULTURE 73, 99 (2002).
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the affected groups.189 A negative synergy, with potentially devastating
consequences, results from media and popular cultural demonization of
Muslims, Arabs and South Asians when combined with government pro-
grams such as NSEERS that force communities into resource-draining de-
fensive postures.
The devastation upon families and communities by indefinite deten-
tions has been deepened by the government's insistence that names and
locations of detainees be kept secret and by other abusive treatment of
detainees, including physical and psychological coercion.1 90 In a series of
reports, the Office of the Inspector General of the United States Justice
Department (OIG) documented a staggering array of abuses suffered by
post-September 11 detainees, whose alleged wrong-doing amounted to
nothing more than minor immigration infractions. For example, the OIG
found that the processing of detainees (including issuance of charging
documents) occurred in some cases no sooner than thirty days from the
date of incarceration, despite INS's stated goal of 72 hours.19 1 The delay
prevented detainees from effectively retaining legal counsel, requesting a
bond hearing or learning of the reasons for their incarceration.
192
Delays were also common in the FBI's required clearance procedures
before the release of post-September 11 detainees. The Justice Depart-
ment's unwritten, though clearly understood, "hold until cleared" policy,
combined with the low priority clearance proceedings, resulted in the av-
erage clearance proceeding taking 80 days. 193 Continued detention of
persons who were otherwise subject to removal or "voluntary departure"
was achieved through the Justice Department's "no bond" policy, which
resulted in ongoing detentions that arguably violated even the minimal
standards of immigration law.19 4
The OIG reported on conditions of confinement at the two facilities
that received the majority of the post-September 11 detainees, Metropoli-
tan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York (MDC) and Passaic County
Jail in Paterson, NewJersey (PCJ). In its original report, the OIG focused
on a range of abuses at the two detention facilities. MDC, the more re-
189. See id. at 99.
190. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Report on Hate Crimes
& Discrimination Against Arab Americans: The Post-September 11 Backlash 32-36 (2002)
[hereinafter ADC 2002 Report] (chronicling cases of abuse against Arabs).
191. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The Septem-
ber 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in
Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks 27-35 (Apr. 2003) [herein-
after OIG Report], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf
(detailing changing requirements for charging documents and presenting statis-
tics on how frequently INS took longer than specified time).
192. See id. (explaining delay in charging documents).
193. See id. at 37-66 (describing "hold until cleared" policy, its implementa-
tion and effects).
194. See id. at 72-87 (describing "no bond" policy, its implementation and
effects).
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strictive of the two facilities, classified post-September 11 detainees as Wit-
ness Security inmates, a classification which prevented families, friends
and lawyers from obtaining crucial information regarding the location of
their loved ones and clients. 195 The detainees could not use the tele-
phone to secure effective legal representation because they were limited to
just one weekly phone call and in some cases, not asked whether they
wished to place their weekly call. 19 6 The detainees typically had not been
able to retain counsel prior to their detention, and limited telephone ac-
cess made it difficult to secure legal representation after being
detained. 197
Physical and verbal abuse of detainees, particularly at MDC, became
the subject of a separate OIG report.1 98 MDC created a special wing for
the post-September 11 detainees that had the most restrictive detention
permissible under the Federal Bureau of Prisons policy, including twenty-
three hour a day lock-downs and constant cell illumination.19 9 The OIG
Report on the MDC investigated the detainees' allegations of physical
abuse, including slamming them into walls, bending and twisting their
arms, hands, wrists and fingers and inflicting pain by using restraints. 200
The OIG also reported allegations of racist and anti-Muslim verbal
abuse. 20 1 The OIG investigation concluded that the allegations of physi-
cal and verbal abuse were credible and supported by videotape and other
evidence, and, therefore, recommended administrative punishment of a
number of the MDC staff members involved in the many instances of
abuse. 202
Government agents subjected other Muslims and Arabs to intimida-
tion through so-called voluntary interviews. In 2001-2002 some 8,000
young men, almost all Arab and/or Muslim, were selected by the Justice
Department for interviews.2 03 The interviews were not compulsory, but
upon receiving letters or being visited by law enforcement agents, many of
195. See id. at 111-18 (relaying MDC classification of detainees at "witness se-
curity" which prevented contact by detainees with others and allegations of abuse).
196. See id. at 130-41 (describing draconian restrictions on inmates contact
with attorneys through phone calls).
197. See id. (recounting case studies that indicated difficulty in obtaining legal
representation with MDC restrictions).
198. U.S. Department ofJustice, Office of the Inspector General, Supplemental
Report on September 11 Detainees' Allegations of Abuse at the Metropolitan Detention Center
in Brooklyn, New York (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter OIG Report on MDC], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0312/final.pdf.
199. See id. at 3 (indicating conditions of incarceration of detainees at MDC).
200. See id. at 6 (reporting allegations by detainees of abuse by staff).
201. See id. at 28-29 (reporting allegations of verbal abuse including numer-
ous death threats and warnings of reprisals for World Trade Center attacks).
202. See id. at 47 (corcluding abuses took place and recommending adminis-
trative action against employees who committed abuses).
203. See ADC 2002 Report, supra note 190, at 36 (finding initially 5000, and
then additional 3000, Arab non-citizens were selected to be investigated between
November 2001 and early 2002); COLE, supra note 83, at 49.
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the targeted individuals nonetheless felt compelled to cooperate. Over
ninety percent of those contacted agreed to be interviewed. 20 4 Twenty of
the interviewees were arrested on minor immigration charges. 20 5 The
agents asked the men, among other things, about their own or their fami-
lies' or friends' political beliefs.
20 6
It is doubtful that the interviews accomplished anything other then
the further alienation of the affected individuals and their communities
from law enforcement. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Commit-
tee did not share Attorney General Ashcroft's positive assessment of the
interview program, doubting the effectiveness and fairness of such ethnic
dragnet techniques of investigation. 20 7 Nonetheless, the government con-
ducted more voluntary interviews targeting Arab and Muslim communities
in the summer of 2004.208 Again, law enforcement officials asked inter-
view subjects about their political views regarding, for example, the United
States invasion of Iraq. 20 9 Members of the Arab and Muslim communities
feared that the interviews signaled suspicion and targeting by the FBI that
might have catastrophic consequences for innocent interviewees.2 10 Mo-
hammad Qazi, national coordinator for the America Muslim Alliance, de-
scribed the chilling effect of the interviews, stating that those who feel
targeted by the campaign "don't want to talk to reporters, they don't want
to contribute money to any Muslim organization, they don't want to get
involved politically in elections, they don't want to give their name or ad-
dress out. People don't want to be visible anymore."
211
The PATRIOT Act, which has been criticized in numerous articles
and books for broadly eroding civil liberties, also enhanced the govern-
ment's already hypertrophied power to attack Islamic charitable organiza-
tions that the government alleges support terrorist organizations.2 1 2 In
204. See ADC 2002 Report, supra note 190, at 36 (finding ninety percent of
those investigated voluntarily submitted to interviews).
205. See id. (indicating small number of interviews resulted in arrests for mi-
nor immigration violations).
206. See id. (dictating questions including inquires into political ideology).
207. See id. (concluding investigations were "ineffective" and "squandered
time and efforts" and potentially increased distrust of government by Arabs).
208. See Mary Beth Sheridan, Interviews of Muslims to Broaden, WASH. POST, July
17, 2004, at Al (reporting new interviews were being undertaken, but only those
identified by intelligence or investigative information).
209. See id. (dictating questions which again include inquires into political
ideology).
210. See id. (indicating how non-citizen Arabs were fearful of deportation simi-
lar to that which followed earlier investigations).
211. See Lisa Emmerich, Muslims Recoil at Revived Scrutiny: Local Agencies Say
FBI Interviews Can Intimidate, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 19, 2004, at BI (reporting
comments of Muslim activist concerning retreat by Muslims from political and so-
cial activism out of fear of investigations).
212. See COLE, supra note 83, at 75-79 (discussing how existing provision of
International Emergency Economic Powers Act were augmented by PATRIOT act
and used to shut down Islamic charities).
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2001-2002, the government froze the assets of the three largest Islamic
charities in the United States, Global Relief Fund, Holy Land Foundation
and Benevolence International. 2 13 The evidentiary basis for these moves
is unclear because the PATRIOT Act allows the Treasury Department to
freeze an organization's assets if an entity is under investigation for violat-
ing the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). 2 14 The
PATRIOT Act allows the government, in defending its actions in court, to
rely on secret evidence. 2 15 The three charities fought the freezing of their
assets in court, but lost.2 16 The Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari
in the Holy Land Foundation case, effectively rubber-stamping a process
which affords Islamic charities almost no chance to discover, let alone re-
but, evidence that they support terrorism.
2 1 7
The anti-Islamic charity cases affect Muslims both politically and cul-
turally and the causes they support. Consider, for example, the closing of
Holy Land Foundation, which the government claimed was a security
threat because of its alleged association with Hamas. Holy Land Founda-
tion is a group that says it sponsors both humanitarian and violent action
in support of the Palestinian cause. The case against Holy Land Founda-
tion, to the extent anyone can understand it in the face of the govern-
ment's reliance on secret evidence, seems premised more on the
213. In one high-profile case, Enaam Arnaout, the Director of Benevolence
International Foundation, was arrested on so-called material support charges. A
great deal of news coverage uncritically reported the government's allegations
against Arnaout. Subsequently, the terrorism charges against Arnaout were
dropped and he pled guilty to the non-terrorist offense of diverting funds for use
in buying supplies for Bosnian and Chechen fighters in the 1990s. None of the
groups Arnaout supported with the diverted funds were deemed terrorist by the
U.S. government. See Council on American-Islamic Relations, The Status of Muslim
Civil Rights in the United States 2003 4 (2003).
214. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is designed
to allow the President to apply economic coercion against countries as part of the
Executive's foreign affairs powers. Under both Presidents Clinton and G.W. Bush,
the IEEPA was used to target special designated terrorist organizations, which in-
cluded many organizations involved in the Palestinian movement. See COLE, supra
note 83, at 76-77.
215. USA PATRIOT Act, §106, amending 50 U.S.C. §1702(a) (1) (b) and ad-
ding 50 U.S.C.A. §1702(c); see also Cole, supra note 83, at 78.
216. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57,
85 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying motion for dismissal and summary judgment by plain-
tiff and granting defendants' motion In Limine and motion to strike); Global Relief
Found. v. O'Neill 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (denying motion for
preliminary injunction by plaintiff); Benevolence Int'l Found. Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200
F. Supp. 2d 935, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (staying case pending outcome of parallel
criminal case).
217. See Elizabeth Amon, Faith, Hope, Charity and Terror Charges: Accused Charity
Says It Was Denied a Real Hearing, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 12, 2004, available at http://www.
law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1078368976257 (discussing denial of certiorari and
government reliance on secret and unsubstantiated evidence).
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organization's proximity to the Palestinian cause than anything else.2 18
The evidence that has been unclassified concerns "contacts" between Holy
Land foundation and Hamas leaders at a conference in 1993, before
Hamas had been designated as a terrorist organization. 2 19 The govern-
ment also alleges Holy Land Foundation paid for a Hamas leader to fly to
the United States in 1990-1991, something the U.S. government itself did
in 1997.220 Finally, Holy Land is accused of giving charitable contribu-
tions to a Hamas-controlled hospital, which, apparently also received fund-
ing from the Red Cross, Great Britain and even the United States Agency
for International Development. 22 1
Many Muslims give to charities in fulfillment of their religious obliga-
tion, which may require 2.5 percent of a person's income be given to char-
ity.222 Many Muslims may choose to give money to support impoverished
Palestinians or related humanitarian efforts as a way of supporting the Pal-
estinian struggle more broadly. The targeting of Islamic charities in the
war on terrorism has proven a strong disincentive among would-be do-
nors, who now fear that the United States government may confiscate
their donations or view them as criminals for having offered material sup-
port to "terrorists."
22 3
The use of the IEEPA and PATRIOT Acts to attack Islamic charities
that have no meaningful chance to defend themselves against charges of
supporting terrorism is, as David Cole argues, akin to the kinds of ideolog-
ical witch hunts of the Cold War.224 The injury to the free speech and
association rights of Muslims who wish to support political causes through
charitable contributions, however, is ethnically selective in nature. Similar
support from Irish Americans for the Irish Republican Army, or from Jew-
ish Americans to support the illegal and violent extremism of so-called
settler groups, did not fall victim to the same kinds of government repres-
sion. 225 Muslim leaders in the United States have come together to make
218. See id. ("[The Foundation] maintained that due process violations oc-
curred as a result of the government's use of secret evidence and the breach of a
federal evidentiary rule on summary judgment.").
219. See id. (relaying charity's ties to Hamas and its founders, some of which
were denied by charity and others tacitly acknowledged, and finding government's
case based on connections to Hamas unpersuasive).
220. See id. (pronouncing Holy Land Foundation paid for six trips to United
States for Hamas founder, but noting at time of trips, Hamas was not designated
terrorist organization).
221. See id. (chronicling support by various organizations of Hamas controlled
hospital and relaying denial of support by charity of suicide bombers' families).
222. See Sahar Aziz, The Laws on Providing Material Support to Terrorist organiza-
tions: The Erosion of Constitutional Rights or a Legitimate Tool for Preventing Terrorism ?, 9
TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 45, 87 (2003) (finding charitable giving requirement com-
mon to many Muslims).
223. See id. at 50-51, 51 n.21 (citing sources discussing chilling effect).
224. See COLE, supra note 83, at 77.
225. See Aziz, supra note 222, at 90 (finding no restrictions on donations to
Irish and Jewish groups).
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the unusual request that the U.S. government provide a list of approved
charities that Muslims could give money to without fearing criminalization
or confiscation. 226 An FBI spokesman doubted such a list would be forth-
coming, leaving Muslims to fear that their charitable acts, as interpreted
by authorities through an anti-Muslim and anti-Arab lens, may loosen the
wrath of law enforcement upon them.
2 27
C. Racialization of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians in Post-September 11
Society and Culture
The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee reported some
700 violent incidents directed at "Arab Americans or those perceived to be
Arab Americans," occurring in the first nine weeks after September 11.228
These violent incidents, including as many as eleven murders, 229 alone fill
nearly 35 pages of the ADC 2002 Report and cannot be summarized in
detail here. 230 One case the ADC reported symbolizes the racial nature of
these attacks.
October 3 - Noroco, CA:
An Arab-American businessman was beaten by two men is ski
masks while he was closing his store. They shoved him to the
back of the store, finally pushing his face into a mirror. They beat
him, calling him "sand n*****." The two men then chained him
as he tried to escape. They sprayed his face with black spray
paint, saying they could "make him a n*****." They poured fire
starter fluid on him and threw liter bottles at him until he lost
consciousness. 2
3 1
In another case in Bridgeview, a suburb of Chicago, a group carried a
Confederate flag as it marched to a mosque chanting "kill the Arabs."
232
Such (literal and figurative) painting of Arab victims of hate violence as
black, use of the "n-word" to fix the victims' place as in the racial hierar-
chy, and rallying under the symbol of the southern slave republic, indicate
226. See Ron Howell, Islamic Organizations Low on Funds, NEWSDAY (New York),
July 14, 2004, at A20 (stating that "Muslim leaders asked federal officals . . . to
come up with a seal of approval that would assure potential donors that a [charita-
ble) group does not have ties to terrorism").
227. See id. (doubting that FBI would provide list of approved, non-terror sup-
porting charities).
228. See ADC 2002 Report, supra note 190, at 47 (confirming over 700 violent
acts and describing nature of attacks).
229. See id. at 69-70 (finding four confirmed and seven suspected hate crime
murders against victims perceived to be Arab).
230. See id. at 49-84 (filling nearly one quarter of report with short excerpts
from newspapers describing crimes).
231. Id. at 66.
232. See Illinois Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
Arab and Muslim Civil Rights Issues in the Chicago Metropolitan Area Post-September 11, 9
(May 2003) (reporting story of Ray Hanania, publisher of Arab-American periodi-
cal, describing hatred of Arabs in Bridgeview).
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the deeper racialization processes at work in these "private" acts of vio-
lence. It seems as if the perpetrators of these attacks, needing to give
meaning to their acts beyond a formal sense of patriotic defense of coun-
try, ground their violence in the images of racist dehumanization with
which they are most familiar. Let Volpp argues that "citizenship" operates
against those who appear to be Middle Eastern, Arab or Muslim regardless
of formal status.233 "Citizenship as identity" can function along existing
racial fault lines to create boundaries that vigilantes feel empowered to
violently enforce.2 3 4
Hate crimes against Arabs, Muslims and South Asians did not, unfor-
tunately, disappear after the immediate aftermath of September 11. In-
stead, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) found that
reported incidents of "harassment, violence and discriminatory treatment
increased nearly 70 percent [in 2003] over 2002 (the year after the 9/11
terrorist attacks)."235 Taken alone, violent attacks against Muslims in-
creased by 121 percent between 2002 and 2003, the largest increase ever
in that category. 23 6 CAIR attributed the rise in reported anti-Muslim inci-
dents to a number of factors, including "It] he war in Iraq and the atmos-
phere created by pro-war rhetoric" and "[t]he noticeable increase of anti-
Muslim rhetoric, which often painted Muslims as followers of a false relig-
ion and as enemies of America."23 7 Again, cultural (religious), racial (for-
eign-ness) and foreign policy (anti-war, pro-Palestinian) determinants
combine in the construction of Arabs and Muslims as demonized and de-
humanized outsiders, available to a hateful and fearful public as literal and
figurative punching bags.
Employment and other forms of economic discrimination also in-
creased sharply after September 11. The ADC reported a fourfold in-
crease in complaints of employment discrimination after September 11.238
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission fielded over 700 "Pro-
cess Type Z" charges of employment discrimination in the 15 months after
September 11.239 Process Type Z charges are a special category created
specifically to deal with discrimination "related to the events of September
11, 2001, against individuals who are or are perceived to be Muslim, Arab,
233. See Let Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rxv. 1575, 1592-
98 (2002) (finding interpellation of "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" citizens).
234. See id. (concluding non-traditional citizens are outside identity of Ameri-
can "imagined community" and are thus denied citizenship as matter of rights).
235. Council on American-Islamic Relations, The Status of Muslim Civil Rights
in the United States 2004 2 (2004) [hereinafter CAIR 2004 Report].
236. See id. at 10.
237. See id. at 2.
238. See ADC 2002 Report, supra note 190, at 92 (detailing dramatic increase in
all types of employment discrimination following September 11, 2001).
239. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Muslim/Arab Employ-
ment Discrimination Charges Since 9/11, Dec. 2, 2002, available at http://www.eeoc.
gov/origin/z-stats.html (providing statistics on number of "Process type Z" charges
of employment discrimination filed).
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Afghani, Middle Eastern or South Asian or individuals alleging retaliation
related to the events of September 11, 2001."24o In addition, EEOC re-
ported another 841 charges of discrimination against Muslims. 2 4 1 Many
of these complaints were dismissed with no cause findings, but their sheer
numbers give a sense of how members of the affected groups have
processed their treatment in the workplace after September 11.
Perhaps the most poignant and telling form of anti-Arab and anti-
Muslim violence, intimidation and discrimination is that affecting children
in educational settings. ADC reported seventy-four cases of violence or
threatened violence in educational settings in the first six months after
September 11.242 Employees reported another thirty-eight cases of harass-
ment to the ADC.243 Certainly, the reported cases of discrimination and
violence in education settings are a fraction of the total, and the children
who were targeted will carry the memory and psychological burden of the
attacks for the rest of their lives.
244
In a bitingly ironic article entitled "Terror-fled," Nadia Afghani poign-
antly articulates the effects of societal hostility and violence on the Orange
County, California Muslim community:
Almost everyone at my mosque has experienced countless
amounts of hatred during the past twenty-some years, and the
majority of it seemed to be aimed at children: boys getting their
faces smashed to unrecognizable pulps; girls pushed around and
their scarves pulled off; students the target of college professors'
racist remarks, not to mention the odd beer can, lit cigarette and
trash thrown at them. Retaliation against Muslims created a fear
that caused many to lock themselves in their houses and pray to
one day see the salad-bowl analogies of this country transpire it-
self [sic] into myth. 24 5
240. See id. (listing disposition of employment discrimination charges).
241. See ADC 2002 Report, supra note 190, App. 2, at 148 (listing Process Type
Z charges by state).
242. See id. at 107-12 (reporting chronologically, cases of educational discrimi-
nation, including death threats, vandalism and physical violence).
243. See id. at 112-16 (reporting non-violent discrimination including un-
founded investigations of Arab students, insensitive comments and racially moti-
vated dismissal of teachers).
244. Nonetheless, ADC singled out certain schools for praise in dealing with
the post-September 11 fallout. School districts such as Washington D.C., which had
functioning multicultural education units, were able to activate resources for the
needed training of teachers who could then better face the problems facing Mus-
lim, Arab and South Asian students in their schools. See id. at 105-07 (praising
schools in Michigan and Washington D.C. with large Arab populations for rela-
tively few incidents).
245. Nadia Afghani, Terror-fled: The War on Terror Begins at Home. My Home,
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Afghani's ironic invocation of a desire to transcend the salad bowl analogy
highlights the hypocrisy of a system that espouses pluralist principles and
tolerance of difference and yet drives Muslims back into a state of private,
"terror-fled" repose. Afghani's term, terror-fled, would seem an apt nam-
ing of the processes by which Muslim and Arab identities have been ra-
cially constructed throughout the 1980s and 90s, but especially after
September 11. "Terror-fication" amounts to the projection of a particu-
larly amorphous and potentially expansive form of security threat-ter-
ror-onto the cultural and ethnic "essence" of now permanently suspect
classes: Muslims, Arabs and South Asians.
D. Political Identity and Racialization
The race-based civil rights movements of the mid-twentieth century
brought about a "great transformation" in U.S. political culture. Omi and
Winant identify the two elements of this transformation as the eclipse of
the ethnicity paradigm, with its embrace of a misleading "immigrant anal-
ogy" that ignored structural disparities between the situations of white eth-
nic versus non-white racial groups, and the rise of new social movements
that expanded the "concerns of politics to the social, to the terrain of eve-
ryday life."'24 6 Importantly, the transformation entailed the articulation of
collective, race-based political identities that proved resilient enough to
survive the demise of the civil rights movement and many of the policies
that movement shaped.24 7 Omi and Winant show how the notion of "in-
terests" in politics expanded to include not just economic but also social
and cultural dimensions, important areas of everyday life that powerfully
structured racial inequality. 248 According to Omi and Winant, the civil
rights movement's most permanent success lay in creating new racial sub-
jects; race-based political identities that formed around the practices and
possibilities of "collective opposition." 249
In this section, I will briefly expand the analysis regarding the racial
status of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians by working backwards, so to
speak, from evidence of collective-pan-ethnic or racial-political identity
formation among Muslims, Arabs and South Asians. Racialized collective
identities are pragmatic in that they allow for effective group mobilization,
but differ from more conventional interest-group formations in projecting
a desire to confront the deeper social structures of racial subordina-
tion.2 50 In modern United States history, racialized and collectively con-
scious political subjects stand as an unmistakable challenge to the equality
246. OMI & WINANT, supra note 125, at 90.
247. See id. at 97 (describing necessary movement).
248. See id. at 98-99 (advocating political structure of interest groups that in-
clude race).
249. See id. at 100-11 (describing movement towards penetrating mainstream
politics and other mass participation tactics).
250. See id. at 101 ("This new state, however, was not the institutional fulfill-
ment of the movements' ideals. Rather it held a cloudy mirror up to its antago-
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claims of liberal democracy. The consolidation of such identities has cor-
responded with the great fault lines of social, political and legal closures
that characterize the United States as a settler-colony.25' Typically, such
identities move collectivities beyond political advocacy of narrow material
interests or attempts to reshape United States foreign policy in support of
national causes abroad.
Racialization of political identities in the United States has entailed
the bridging of national or ethnic differences through "pan-ethnic" forma-
tions.2 5 2 Evidence of such a trend among Muslims and Arabs existed well
before September 11. As Karen Leonard's extensive survey of the research
on Muslims in the United States has shown, a decade of intense political
organization led to the creation in 1999 of the American Muslim Political
Coordinating Council (AMPCC).253 The AMPCC was a coalition of Mus-
lim political organizations that together, represented multi-ethnic Muslim
political leadership. 254 The four organizations that came together to form
AMPCC reflected a shift in Muslim-American political identity that re-
sulted when the leadership in the 1980s moved away from a strictly out-
sider identity-one that valorized temporary residence in the United
States-and instead began advocating acquisition of United States citizen-
ship and involvement in mainstream political life.2 55 The result was the
creation of a number of professional national Muslim political advocacy
groups in the late 1980s and early 1990s that sought to politicize Muslims
in the United States.25 6
The American Muslim political organizations acted as lobbyists for
Muslim interests and as recruitment vehicles to encourage Muslims to run
for office.25 7 Just before the elections in 2000, a merger of organizations
occurred that indicated the further consolidation of Muslim political orga-
nists, reflecting their demands (and indeed their rearticulated racial identities) in
a distorted fashion.").
251. See Natsu Taylor Saito, For "Our" Security: Who is an "American" and What is
Protected by Enhanced Law Enforcement and Intelligence Powers ?, 2 SEATrLEJ. SOC. JUST.
23, 26 (2003) (laying out structural and racial determinants of U.S. citizenship and
membership in "America" generally).
252. See, e.g., YEN LE ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PAN-ETHNICIT. BRIDGING INSTI-
TUTIONS AND IDENTITIES (1992) (discussing theory of "reactive solidarity," whereby
outside threat may create conditions of solidarity across ethnic lines).
253. See KAREN ISAKSEN LEONARD, MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE STATE
OF RESEARCH 18 (2003) (discussing politicalization of American Muslim commun-
ity).
254. See id. (stating diversity of leadership among Muslim groups).
255. See id. (identifying four organizations: Muslim Public Affairs Council
(Los Angeles), American Muslim Alliance (Oakland), American Muslim Council
(Washington, D.C.) and Council on American-Islamic Relations (Washington,
D.C.)).
256. See id. ("Further political shifts occurred at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury as the national-origin communities reached out to other Muslims and the
American public.").
257. See id. at 19 ("They engage in political lobbying and encourage Muslims
to run for electoral office.").
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nizations.2 58 Moreover, in the same year, a historic meeting brought to-
gether the four major Arab and five major Muslim organizations. 259 This
pan-ethnic group agreed to a common agenda involving the "future of
Jerusalem, civil and human rights, participation in the electoral process,
and inclusion in political structures," thus entailing a mix of foreign policy
and domestic civil rights and political empowerment issues. 260 Still, Leo-
nard argues that foreign policy concerns channeled much of the political
energy of these organizations and coalitions, including the decision by
some Muslim organizations to push the Muslim vote to support George W.
Bush in the presidential election. 26 1 After September 11, however, Leo-
nard observed that Muslim political organizations dramatically changed
directions by emphasizing domestic policy concerns over foreign ones. 262
Hussein Ibish, Communications Director for the ADC, also wrote
shortly after September 11 about the changes affecting "secular" Arab-
American political organizations.2 6 3 Ibish's analysis tied pre-September 11
Arab-American civil rights activism back to problems created by United
States foreign policy in the Middle East:
It is ADC's belief that until there is a more rational American
foreign policy, more of congruence of views about the United
States stands for and why in the Middle East and how to interpret
events in the Arab world, one cannot really address the discrimi-
nation that the community faces: barriers to full political partici-
pation, for example, or the kind of negative and hostile discourse
in the news media and the kind of representations you get in film
and television. Because of that ADC also focuses on foreign
policy.
This is integral to our civil rights effort. ADC sees a civil liberties
or civil rights agenda as inseparable from a foreign policy
agenda. Without the foreign policy agenda, it would be impossi-
ble to treat the causes of discrimination. It might be possible to
patch the symptoms a little bit, but not the roots and the causes
of discrimination. 26
4
258. See id. ("The then-head of the AMA [American Muslim Alliance] and
AMPCC, Dr. Agha Saeed (2000) said the merger marked, 'the beginning of a new
phase of American Muslim politics .... '").
259. See id. (noting merger of four Arab-American and five Muslim
organizations).
260. Id. (stating goals of organization).
261. See id. at 20 (stating critical swing occurring when "Bush declared himself
opposed to secret evidence in a debate with Gore in Michigan").
262. See id. at 23 (describing organizations' reasoning to concentrate on do-
mestic political issues).
263. See generally Hussein Ibish, Patterns of Arab-American Activism, available at
http://wvics.si.edu/events/docs/ibish.pdf (summarizing thesis of article).
264. Id. at 2.
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Asserting such linkages between ADC's domestic civil rights agenda and
United States foreign policy is not unprecedented in United States racial
formation history. 265 Indeed, Ibish cites to a "long tradition of protests,
vigils, and letter writing campaigns," along with boycotts and local protests
by Arab-Americans all of which recalls the civil rights tactics of African
American and other racialized minorities. 266
In the post-September 11 context, several important shifts have oc-
curred that may augur in the direction of an even more sustained civil
rights-based political identity for Muslims, Arabs and South Asians. One
simple way of gauging the effect of post-September 11 repression on the
political life of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians would be to observe how
it might impact voting preferences. Press reports uniformly held that
groups of Muslim and Arab voters in the 2000 presidential election sup-
ported the conservative candidate George W. Bush for President, perhaps
even supplying the margin of victory in the disputed Florida race.2 67 By
summer 2004, the percentage surveyed who said they planned to vote for
Bush in the 2004 election had dropped to as low as ten percent in some
polls.
2 6 8
The story about how this shift in electoral preferences has occurred is
more complex than surface appearances might suggest, but it nonetheless
signals a shift away from what many saw as a trend among Muslim and
Arab voters supporting conservative candidates. 26 9 Political interests un-
derstood more narrowly and strictly as a function of certain pivotal foreign
265. See, e.g., Gil Gott, Critical Race Globalism?: Global Political Economy, and the
Intersections of Race, Nation, and Class, 33 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1503 (2000) (discussing
history of race internationalists such as DuBois and Robeson).
266. See Ibish, supra note 263, at 6 (discussing effectiveness of grassroots
movements).
267. See Abdullah A. Al-Arian, Soul Survival: The Road to Muslim Political Empow-
erment, 23 WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFF. 74, 81 (2004) (discussing survey of Mus-
lim voters in Florida during 2000 election showing that, "[i]f taken to be
representative... 18,496 Muslims in Florida voted for Bush, while only 3,709 voted
for Gore, a difference of 14,787 votes-nearly 30 times the margin of victory").
268. See Deborah Horan, Muslims, Arabs Say Key Bush Vote May Swing Other Way,
CHI. TRIB.,Jan. 18, 2004, at A3 (stating that according to one poll, "Arab-American
Muslims rate Bush's overall performance 'unfavorable'").
269. See LEONARD, supra note 253, at 20 (discussing shift after Bush-Gore De-
bate in Michigan); A1-Arian, supra note 267, at 80-81 (describing overarching de-
sire among Muslim American leaders to impact election of one of candidates as
way of demonstrating Muslim electoral clout). It seems Hillary Clinton's decision
to return a $50,000 check to the American Muslim Alliance may have played a
significant role in creating the conditions behind Muslim Americans voting in a
bloc for Bush, suggesting a strategic decision to bring Democrats in line with Mus-
lim interests. Bush's public opposition to the use of secret evidence, as stated in
one of the 2000 presidential debates, also played a large role. Generally, it seems
leaders in the Muslim community wanted to demonstrate the existence of a Mus-
lim voting bloc that would not allow itself to be taken for granted by putatively
liberal candidates. See LEONARD, supra note 253, at 20 (discussing American Mus-
lim participation in 2000 election); AI-Arian, supra note 267, at 80-81 (discussing
"Birth of the Muslim Bloc").
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policy concerns may have fostered the possibility of electoral party-shop-
ping among Muslims and Arabs in the United States. Neither major politi-
cal party in the United States, for example, has unambiguously
championed the rights of Palestinians. In 2000, a perception existed
among Muslim American leaders that Bush/Cheney might be more sup-
portive of Palestinians than Gore/Lieberman, leading Muslim voters in
the United States to vote Republican. 270 Conversely, as more traditional
civil rights concerns have come to the forefront after September 11, large
numbers of Muslims and Arabs in the United States have shifted their sup-
port toward Democrats, the party more strongly associated with a tradi-
tional civil rights agenda.
271
Studies have shown a marked increase in both religiosity and political
ambition among Muslims since September 11.272 Researchers draw a con-
nection between the strengthening of Islamic ties among Muslims and an
increased desire to participate in United States politics. Amaney Jamal
shows such a correlation in her study of mosques attendance and political
participation. 2 73 Interestingly, Jamal's work drew inspiration from the
role played by Black churches in the creation of politicized group con-
sciousness among African Americans. 274 Jamal found that for Arab Mus-
lims, "mosques are directly linked to political activity, civic participation
and group consciousness." 275 A sense of "common fate," a characteristic
of the group consciousness for whichJamal tested, brings Arab Muslims to
see "the injustice that occurs to one Muslim" as "an injustice that has be-
fallen the entire Muslim community."2 76 In light ofJamal's work, it would
270. See LEONARD, supra note 253, at 20 (discussing political inclinations of
Muslims in 2000 election).
271. See William McKenzie, What's on Muslim Minds?: Bush Shouldn't Take This
Vote for Granted, DALLAs MoRNING NEWS, July 6, 2004, at 15A (citing civil rights
concerns among Muslim voters supportingJohn Kerry for president). It should be
noted that the issue of secret evidence being used in deportation cases does sound
in traditional civil rights conceptions of justice. See A1-Arian, supra note 267, at 80
(concluding that 2000 election was first time foreign policy issues were afforded
secondary status).
272. See Geneive Abdo, Study gauges 9/11 effect on U.S. Muslims; Interest in Relig-
ion, Politics Deepens, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 2004, at 13 (linking stronger sense of relig-
ious identity to greater concern with political participation among Muslims in
United States).
273. See generally Amaney Jamal, Political Engagement and the Participation of
Muslim Americans (2005), available at http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/33/4/
521.pdf (discussing effect of religious involvement on political participation in
America's Muslim communities).
274. See id. at 2 (stating that "politicized black churches foster a sense of
group consciousness by collectivizing the interests of the sub-group in an effort to
counter prejudice and discrimination from the mainstream theory").
275. Id. at 17.
276. See id. Jamal's study disaggregates Muslims in the United States into
three groups: Arab Muslims, South Asian Muslims and African American Muslims.
See id. (stating categories of Muslims used in research). Her findings on politiciza-
tion and group consciousness apply most strongly to Arab Muslims, but not neces-
sarily to the other two groups. See id. ("For Arab Muslims, mosque participation
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seem that the United States government's policy of targeting mosques for
investigation and surveillance will only deepen mosque-goers' collective
consciousness and politicization.
277
The impact of Muslim and Arab politicization has been felt in many
cities where Arab-American activists were instrumental in successful cam-
paigns to pass resolutions condemning the PATRIOT Act, or denouncing
the invasion of Iraq.278 Most recently, Arab and Muslim organizations
have coordinated efforts supporting a law that would rectify many of the
abuses those communities have experienced at the hands of the federal
government. The bill, called the Civil Liberties Restoration Act, would
insure that all deportation hearings are open to the public, that deten-
tions are limited to forty-eight hours before a bond hearing is provided,
and that the NSEERS program is terminated. 279 These efforts mark a
clear turn toward a more traditional civil rights-based political agenda and
identity that seems capable of drawing together Muslims and Arabs from a
range of ethnic and national backgrounds. 28 0
Equally as impressive is the sustained and effective organization of
Muslim and Arab political voices; not just through voter participation, but
also through fielding candidates in local, state and national elections.
This trend began in the early 1990s and, though the number of Muslim
and Arab candidates sometimes failed to meet the ambitious goals of or-
ganizers, continues through the current 2004 election cycle. 28 1 These
electoral trends are paralleled by an active Muslim and Arab civil society,
where organizations such as ADC and CAIR must be counted among some
of the most effective and professional national civil rights organizations.
The leaders of these groups vary in how they approach the question of
political identity formation, but oppositional politics emanating from such
increase is linked to greater forms of political activity."). Jamal explains the differ-
ent reactions of the Muslim groups to mosque involvement using pre-existing eth-
nic and cultural differences. See id. at 14-16 (discussing reasonsing for these
variances).
277. See id. (describing United States government's focus on mosque attend-
ance as "worrisome").
278. See Hillary Wundrow, Arab Americans on the Move: Anti-War and Civil Rights
Resolutions, ARAB AMERICAN INsTrUTE, Mar. 24, 2003, at http://www.aaiusa.org/
anti-warresolution.htm ("Civil rights organizations, constitutional experts and
lawmakers have challenged these laws at all levels of government. These groups
are leading the fight to repeal the laws and protect individual rights."). It is re-
ported that 357 cities and towns have passed such ordinances. See Bill of Rights
Defense Committee, at http://www.bordc.org/index.html (last modified Nov. 12,
2004) (discussing ordinances).
279. See Civil Liberties Restoration Act (May 27, 2004), available at http://www.
immigrationforum.org/documents/TheDebate/DueProcessPost9 1/
CLRAsecbysec.pdf.
280. See Niraj Warikoo, Michigan Residents Push Civil Rights Bill; Arabs, Muslim
Groups to Lobby U.S. Legislators, DET. FREE PREss, June 10, 2004, at 4B (describing
efforts by Pakistani, Muslim and other Arab groups lobbying on Capitol Hill for
passage of civil liberties bill).
281. See Al-Arian, supra note 267, at 80.
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groups in the post-September 11 context evinces a pronounced reliance
on identity as a basis for gathering support.
E. Evaluation
Sucheng Chan's social history of Asian Americans provides some fun-
damental themes for understanding the processes by which "alien" outsid-
ers are racialized and subordinated.2 82 Chan's book presents Asian
American history as shaped in significant part by a dialectical process in-
volving movement between the poles of "hostility and conflict" and "resis-
tance." Within this general schema, Chan shows how Asian Americans are
viewed as both "perpetual foreigners" and a nonwhite racial minority
group, insisting that both aspects are indispensable elements to under-
standing the group's history.2 83 Chan's categorization of the various types
of hostilities faced by Asian Americans reflects both anti-immigrant and
racist dimensions of anti-Asian American hostility: "prejudice, economic
discrimination, political disenfranchisement, physical violence, immigra-
tion exclusion, social segregation, and incarceration. '"2 84
The evidence presented here reveals that the status of Muslims, Arabs
and South Asians in the United States society has been, and continues to
be, shaped by forces similar to those Chan identifies in the Asian Ameri-
can context. 285 These forces, operating at the levels of the state, society
and market, roughly fit the categories Chan induces from her research.
Hostility and conflict, evincing cultural and racial but also ideological
forms of animus, have been met with responses indicating. the formation
of racialized, group-based political identities. At the level of the state, poli-
cies affecting Muslims, Arabs and South Asians have included selective im-
migration and law enforcement actions, which, taken together with the
stigmatization of Arabs or Muslims in the public sphere, have created con-
ditions of political disenfranchisement. In the realm of social relations,
prejudice and ethnic hatred toward Muslims, Arabs and South Asians have
most notoriously been manifested in hate crimes, but also in exclusions
from civil society organizations and in characteristically bigoted and stere-
otyping representation in popular culture and the media. Subordination
in the market has been reflected in employment and other forms of eco-
nomic discrimination. Finally, various forms of race-conscious resistance
to such hostility and conflict are everywhere in evidence.
282. See SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 45, 167-
69 (1991) (discussing conflict of being part of "model minority" while maintaining
"second-class" citizenship).
283. See id. at 187 ("[A]s people of nonwhite origins bearing distinct physical
differences, they [Asians] have been perceived as 'perpetual foreigners' who can
never be completely absorbed into American society and its body politic.").
284. Id. at 45 n.1.
285. See also Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Defer-
ence, and the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 1, 13-19 (2002) (discussing "racialization of foreignness" in context of Wen
Ho Lee case).
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IV. THE RACIALIZATION OF SECURITY AND THE PROBLEM OF "POST-
POLITICAL" STATE VIOLENCE
The previous section makes two important points that should be
taken into account in rethinking the problem of the security exception in
American liberal democracy. First, Muslims, Arabs and South Asians are
increasingly positioned as a racialized minority, marked by both legal and
social forms of discrimination and subordination. Second, security in the
war on terrorism is itself a racialized, and thus uniquely contested concept,
characterized by ambiguity and line-blurring that accompanies romanti-
cized renderings of threats and of the friend-enemy distinction. There is,
in other words, both securitization of race,28 6 as Muslims, Arabs and South
Asians become racially and immutably constructed as enemy others (ter-
ror-fication), and racialization of security,287 the process by which threat
and conflict are conceptually stripped of their social and political mean-
ings as the products of interest divergences and rearticulated as racially
psychologized anxieties over threatened security and national identity.
2 8 8
In this section, I will briefly consider a theoretical re-contextualization
of the problem of the exception by looking to the international system
within which regimes of exception have paradigmatically arisen and oper-
ated. I will argue that the changing structure of the international political
system within which states exercise their power over "bare life" has created
a plethora of new openings for states to pursue problematic (irrational,
ambiguous, arbitrary, racist, etc.) deployments of violence and regimes of
exception. Such transformations of the international political structures
conduce, generally, to the racialization of security. At a minimum, liberal
legal assessments of the proper law/security tradeoff, particularly those
tilting toward tolerance of political branch autonomy in the exercise of
national security power, should account for such structural changes.
State violence, the seeming embodiment of the extra-legal Hobbesian
or Schmittian moment, appears quite rational as an element of the mod-
em international state system. This rationality is grounded in the territo-
rial logic of the modern international political system by which violent acts
of states are linked to national material interests. State violence of a pre-
modern or irrational kind, "crusades" bent on imposing particular forms
286. See infra Part III (discussing securitization of race, speaking to ways that
racial formation in United States relates to state's exercise of its security function
and that we may be seeing new form of racialization).
287. The racialization of security refers to the various ways that threatening
aspects of the external realm are racialized.
288. See MICHAEL ROGIN, RONALD REAGAN, THE MOVIE AND OTHER EPISODES IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEMONOLOGY 68-80 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1987) (1981) (discuss-
ing Cold War as third movement in history of counter-subversion). I extrapolate
from Rogin, who was making a more general, non-race critical point about the
"counter-subversive response" to Cold War challenges from communists and labor.
Rogin argues that the psychologization of threat begat "exaggerated responses"
that "narrowed the bounds of permissible political disagreement and generated a
national-security state." Id. at 68.
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of cultural or political identity, ideologies or conceptions of "the good" on
other states, for example, violate the logic of the modern system. 289 This
rationalist understanding of state violence is what Clausewitz meant when
he referred famously to war as politics pursued by other means.290 Polit-
ics, viewed as the competitive pursuit of material interests, simply adopts in
war forceful means in pursuit of rational ends.
Within this generalized system of legitimated state violence, democra-
cies must additionally ground their deployments of violence and excep-
tion-creation in the consent, real or implied, of the constituting
sovereign-the people. State violence occurring within a tightly struc-
tured modem international political system made up of territorially de-
fined, rational, self interest-seeking states readily comports with the
authorization story democracies must tell. The "national interest" may be
said to stand in harmony with state violence and regimes of exception so
long as certain basic territorial and rationalist assumptions hold. A broad
range of violent acts may be "authorized" in this sense, ranging from inter-
national "preventive" uses of force to the creation domestically of states of
exception that subordinate the interests and status of "enemy" groups to
the interests of the state and the popular sovereignty it embodies.2 9 1 This
is, at bottom, the minimal authorizing story that liberal accommodation-
ists must tell when they countenance exceptional security powers, rela-
tively unchecked by substantive norms or judicial process.
Nevertheless, what if the world described by the model of the modern
international political system has passed? Here, Samuel Huntington's no-
tion of civilization clashes as the fundamental conflict form in the post-
Cold War international system conveys a sense of the structural-historical
transformations that make modern internationalist notions of politics and
territory seem dated. As Rob Walker notes, even though we may find little
to recommend Huntington's scholarship generally, his civilizations thesis
289. See R.B.J. Walker, War, Terror, Judgement 1, 5 (2002), available at http://
www.isv.uit.no/ansatte/edvarda/stuartr/91 lwalkerfinalmsword.htm (comparing
modern conflicts with those of seventeenth century religious wars, Renaissance hu-
manism, etc.).
290. See id. at 17-18 & n.5 ("He is most famous for the notion that war is the
continuation of politics by other means. .. ").
291. The term "authorize" is used here simply to mean that preventive attacks
of the sort contemplated in President Bush's National Security Strategy, which will
in most cases violate international laws governing use of force, can be conceived as
legitimate from the perspective of the ultimate sovereign, the people. See generally
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (discussing fear of terrorist attacks on United
States). Even the whipping up of patriotic fervor to goad the public into support-
ing state violence can claim a rational basis so long as the state's violent campaign
can be construed to relate back through the territorial and rational model of the
modern state in the modern state system to the interests of the people. Manipu-
lated patriotism is just the means to achieve the rational end of mass mobilization
in the people's interest. See Walker, supra note 289, at 15 (explaining that political
mobilization and fear is disguised by patriotism).
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usefully characterizes a "decisive transformation." 29 2 Hegemonic states
operating in a world of truly clashing civilizations might behave as the
United States does. But, this does not mean that Huntington's civiliza-
tions really exist or that such "entities" would be structurally destined to
conflict as he suggests.
Instead, we might understand the conceptual shift to civilizations as
part of a "snappy historical script" signaling a broader shift away from the
modern international state system and its assumption about states as the
authors and objects of legitimate violence, the purveyors of rational polit-
ics. 293 Declaring war on terrorism makes sense within the logic of a civili-
zations clash, but not simply because so-called Islamist terrorists fall neatly
into one of the ontologically anti-Western civilizational categories that
Huntington proposes. The enemy in the war on terrorism shares with civi-
lizations a disjointed relationship to the world of territorial states. As
Walker suggests, the United States and its allies are positioned to deploy
interventionary force globally in ways that are unpredictable, if not arbi-
trary, from the perspective of the old rules. 29 4
The new game seems more akin to a "post-political" imperial system
where sovereignty is a strictly hierarchical concept, no longer paired with
equality (as in the modern political doctrinal coupling "sovereign equal-
ity"), and where violence is authorized according to a developmental nar-
rative that makes of freedom and self-determination the type of hollow
rhetorical compliment hypocrisy pays to virtue. Just as nineteenth century
liberalism legitimated imperialism by creating anthropological pre-qualifi-
cations for the right to self-government, which colonized peoples, of
course, mostly failed to meet, sovereign prerogative is today categorically
denied to a wide range of non-Western, non-neoliberal forms of political
and social organizations, categorized variously as barbaric, rogue, un-free
or un-democratic. 295
Walker links a fundamental shift in conceptions of sovereignty, polit-
ics and the exception with the way the war on terrorism is able rather
arbitrarily to ascribe enemy status and unleash violence:
The most striking feature of Bush's declarations of war has been
that they have been understandable less in relation to a sovereign
capacity to declare a state of emergency, a capacity to suspend all
norms of everyday behavior, in relation to another sovereign
state than in relation to an enemy that is essentially intangible
and disconnected from any territorial state and which can be
projected almost at will onto any convenient territories, bodies
292. See id. at 19 (discussing Huntington's theory).
293. See id. at 19-20 (articulating new distinctions between friends and
enemies).
294. See id. at 19-21 (discussing likely tactics of United States and Great Britain
in response to threat of terror).
295. See generally UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE (1999).
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and peoples. This may be sovereignty, but it is not sovereignty as
we are supposed to know it. 2 9 6
Walker's observation suggests that conditions today are every bit as condu-
cive to the racialization of security as in the days of the Japanese intern-
ment.297 The openings in the international system created by the onset of
the new "logic" are, unfortunately, openings onto the "irrational"-the at-
avisms by which the world is carved up along identity lines.
Certainly, it was also true that the old international system's logic of
sovereign equality did not prevent racialized enemy groups from being
constructed and violated. What has changed is that in the war on terror-
ism, the identities of demonized groups are decoupled from the logic of
the international system of states. "Islam," "terrorists" and "Arabs" make
no sense as enemies of the United States from the perspective of the mod-
ern international system. In this sense, racialization of security has be-
come a process that is unbound by the constraints of territorialized
political identity. In the Japanese internment, race made the citizenship
distinctions between Japanese and Japanese Americans irrelevant. Today's
racialized enemy groupings transcend the very system of territorialized
politics, reminiscent of the way pirates were constructed as enemies of
mankind.
If indeed we are witnessing the spread of irrational and "de-
politicized" state violence, i.e., as decoupled from the logic of
Clausewitzian politics and the international system of rational state vio-
lence, it seems worthwhile to contemplate a more robust role for substan-
tive legal norms, legal process and reasoning. Liberal legal models
emphasizing social learning or "ameliorative trends" in the culture of civil
liberties as elements in a more enlightened security state should not ig-
nore the ways state action and actors respond to conditions that cut
against the effectiveness of such social learning to liberalize the state's ex-
ercise of the security function. Accommodationist approaches, in particu-
lar process-based approaches, should grapple with the substantive
questions regarding democratic authorization of state violence under
reconfigured post-political and imperial forms of state sovereignty. The
prevalence of conditions under which security may so easily become sub-
ject to irrational, ambiguous, arbitrary and racist line-drawing along the
friend-enemy distinction renders decisions on the exception suspect and
should open them to the widest possible outcomes-oriented scrutiny.
296. Walker, supra note 289, at 16.
297. It is hard, for example, even to imagine one non-racialized "enemy" of
the United States in the post-Cold War era, unless we count the countries of Rum-
sfeld's "old Europe."
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V. CONCLUSION: THE SECURITIZATION OF RACE
"The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'emergency situa-
tion' in which we live is the rule."298 The Japanese internment constitutes
a thematic common denominator in practically all post-September 11 le-
gal analyses of state security powers. This is actually somewhat surprising
since the internmentjurisprudence had not been viewed as a precedential
centerpiece in the sub-discipline of national security and foreign affairs
prior to September 11.299 The internment, however, has become impor-
tant for the ways it symbolizes a trauma or an evil that the nation as a
whole somehow acknowledges (as past), survives and transcends. 300 View-
ing the internment as symbolic of a nationally transcended evil parallels
the dominant constitutional "survivor story" that legal liberalism in the
United States tells with regard to slavery.3
01
Such survivor stories, according to which everyone within the nation
is equally a "victim" and survivor of the past evil, along with related re-
gimes of "survivor justice," assume a strategic role in moving the "nation"
forward in the aftermath of systemic evil, while also in purging the state of
accountability. Unsurprisingly, the winners under conditions of survivor
justice are not the real victims of the past or present evils, but rather those
who benefit under the hegemonic conditions of such systemic injustice. 30 2
Under the logic of survivor justice, equal protection principles can be in-
terpreted as being void of anti-subordinationist commitments such that
would legitimate robust substantive and effects-based "victim justice."3 03
Indeed, just as Lincoln viewed demonization of the defeated South as an
evil in itself, attempts to rectify injustices at the expense of "innocent" ben-
298. Walter Benjamin, The Concept of Histoy, GESAMMELTEN SCHRiFTEN 1:2
Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main (Dennis Redmond trans., 2001) (1974),
available at http://www.efn.org/-dredmond/Theses onHistory.PDF.
299. See Gott, supra note 16, at 194-202 (describing discipline's treatment of
Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown cases as discipline's orienting precedents). On an-
other level, of course, discussion of the internment seems quite natural in the post-
September 11 context. Conditions facing Muslims, Arabs and South Asians recall
the anti-Japanese racial animus of the World War II era, and the scholarship rightly
focuses on the internment as symbolic of the nation's relationship to racialized
subordination of "enemy minorities."
300. See generally Robert Meister, Two Concepts of Victimhood in Transitional Re-
gime (1998). ("The point of survivor's justice, thus conceived, is to go forward on a
common moral footing-not because the past has been forgiven or forgotten, but
because continuing to struggle against an evil that is gone is no longer appropri-
ate, and may be morally equivalent to reviving it.").
301. See Robert Meister, Sojourners and Survivors: Two Logics of Constitutional
Protection, 3 U. CHI, L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 121, 123 (1996) ("The figure of the so-
journer was generalized to encompass the believer in an alien creed, the member
of a marginal group, and eventually the bearer of an alternative conception of
human normality. The figure of the slave was similarly generalized .... ).
302. See id. at 170 (discussing that survival protections are typically afforded
only after victimized groups survive).
303. See id. at 137-44 (emphasizing recognition and change to encourage
unity rather than reparations for past actions that continue to discriminate).
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eficiaries-cum-victims of that injustice can be viewed as evil under survivor
justice.3 0 4
In the immediate context of the war on terrorism, treating the intern-
ment as transcended/survived has the effect of de-historicizing the current
repression of Muslims, Arabs and South Asians, disconnecting it from the
ongoing related national traumas of racist psychologization of security and
threat, reactionary assertions of white national identity and the attendant
subjection of liberal democratic values to the paranoidic closures of the
security state. 30 5 When the internment is instead taken to symbolize an
imperative of political accountability toward racial injustices, it under-
writes a model of constitutional justice as a continuation of the various
justice struggles thatJapanese Americans and their supporters have waged,
from the "no-no" movement and other resistance efforts in the internment
camps themselves, to the reparations and redress campaign of the 1980s
and 90s. 30
6
Viewing the "internment this time" as rooted in these ongoing
traumas puts into play strategies and models of constitutional justice that
form part of an unbroken chain-call it a constitutional solidarity-with
anti-internment justice struggles. Under such models ofjustice the state-
in distinction from the security state with its racialized friend-enemy logic,
overweening assurance imperative, legitimation issues, etc.-links the pre-
sent with the past, in Benjamin's terms, messianically. Accountability is
insured in a present that is "shot through" with the traumatic past. Con-
temporary institutions and actions are rooted in a-temporal solidarity with
anti-subordinationist struggle. There can be no easy redemption through
"transcendence" of past evil, a notion premised on a positivist view of his-
tory that Benjamin rejects. Past and present form a constellation, and
grasping that constellation is a redemptive act that itself necessarily tran-
scends positivist management of the past.
As ambitious as such an anti-subordinationist vision may sound under
current conditions, it seems entirely in sync with the spirit of Justice Wil-
liam Brennan's pragmatic security jurisprudence, summed up in a speech
he gave at the Law School of Hebrew University in 1987:
A jurisprudence capable of braving the overblown claims of na-
tional security must be forged in times of crisis by the sort of
intimate familiarity with national security threats that tests their
bases in fact, explores their relation to the exercise of civil free-
doms, and probes the limits of their compass. This sort of true
304. See id. at 143-44 ("For Lincoln the central point is that, together, we sur-
vived an experience that almost killed us .... Lincoln's story of national survival is
not reparations, but rather a new beginning-a new covenant between former vic-
tim and the former perpetrator .... ").
305. See RoGIN, supra note 288, at 76 (resulting in increased reactionary sur-
veillance and FBI activities).
306. Again, I owe this framing to Robert Meister. For a further discussion of
Meister's position, see Meister, supra note 300 and accompanying text.
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familiarity cannot be gained merely by abstract deduction, histor-
ical retrospection, or episodic exposure, but requires long-lasting
experience with the struggle to preserve civil liberties in the face
of a continuing national security threat.30
7
Though framed literally in the familiar terms of individual civil liberties,
Brennan's jurisprudence entails a substantive and processual pre-commit-
ment to combat security-induced injustices, especially in light of "over-
blown" national security claims. Brennan also incorporates a critical
understanding of the constructedness of security threats themselves and
an awareness of the complex linkages between the realm of national secur-
ity and threat construction and the realm of social freedom.
Brennan's vision, then, comprises substantive and processual commit-
ments as well as conceptual complexity in a way that appears wholly in
accord with the primacy afforded here to group-based dimensions of state
security overreach. The record from the new war on terror makes it abun-
dandy clear that in order to be effective now our venerated liberal demo-
cratic tradition of resisting and containing state security overreach must be
nurtured by our "long-lasting experience" and "intimate familiarity" with
the subordinationist, group-based effects of national security law. Other-
wise, we will fail to engage the central crisis of the time, involving at once
the various devils the state tells us it knows and the sort of subordination-
ism that our society knows all too well.
307. WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties
in Times of Security Crisis, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 11, 20 (1988).
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